Journal of Catholic Legal Studies
Volume 46, 2007, Number 2

Article 5

Catholics in Public Life: Judges, Legislatures, and Voters
Gregory A. Kalscheur, S.J.

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/jcls
Part of the Catholic Studies Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Catholic Legal Studies by an authorized editor of St. John's Law
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

CATHOLICS IN PUBLIC LIFE: JUDGES,
LEGISLATORS, AND VOTERS
GREGORY

A. KALSCHEUR, S.J.t

INTRODUCTION

Confusion often accompanies contemporary discussion of
questions related to Catholic participation in public life. 1 It does
so, in part, because participants in such discussions often fail to
recognize that Catholics participate in public life in different
ways that give them different sorts of roles. There are Catholic
legislators and executive officials, there are Catholic voters, there
are Catholic judges, and, within the judicial branch, there are
trial judges and appellate judges, working in both state courts
and federal courts.
All Catholics involved in public life-whether as judges,
legislators, or voters-have a moral obligation to promote the
common good through their participation in public life. 2 But I do
t Assistant Professor, Boston College Law School. LL.M. 2003, Columbia Law
School; J.D. 1988, Michigan Law School; S.T.L. 2002, M.Div. 2001, Weston Jesuit
School of Theology; A.B. 1985, Georgetown University. This Essay is a revised
version of the Jesuit Partnership Lecture delivered at Marquette University on
August 30, 2006 and a presentation given at St. Michael's College, Colchester,
Vermont, on November 2, 2006. I am grateful for the helpful comments about this
Essay that I received during a faculty colloquium at the Notre Dame Law School.
I See, e.g., James L. Heft, S.M., US Catholics and the Presidential Election:
Abortion and ProportionateReasons, 86 NEW BLACKFRIARS 259, 259 (2005) ("A
Jesuit, who is also a moral philosopher, recently remarked, 'I have never before
encountered ... such intense concern and confusion over faith and politics as I do
nowadays.'" (quoting John F. Kavanaugh, S.J., Catholic Consciences, AMERICA, July
19-26, 2004, at 7, 7)).
2 See,
e.g., JOHN PAUL II, POST-SYNODAL APOSTOLIC
EXHORTATION
42 (1988) [hereinafter CHRISTIFIDELES LAICI].
CHRISTIFIDELES LAIC
In order to achieve their task directed to the Christian animation of the
temporal order, in the sense of serving persons and society, the lay faithful
are never to relinquish their participation in "public life," that is, in the
many different economic, social, legislative, administrative and cultural
areas, which are intended to promote organically and institutionally the
common good.... [E]very person has a right and a duty to participate in
public life, albeit in a diversity and complementarity of forms, levels, tasks
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not believe we can coherently talk about the questions sometimes
raised about Catholic participation in public life without
recognizing that the different roles played by Catholic public
officials call them to make a range of distinct sorts of decisions.
These different sorts of decisions give rise to complex sets of
moral questions, which cannot be answered with a general,
sound-bite response. In this Essay, I will try to bring some
clarity to the confusion by focusing attention on one public role
played by Catholics, that of the judge. Along the way, I hope also
to shed some light on the questions raised by the different public
roles played by legislators and voters.
The media focused attention on the question of the role of the
Catholic judge in the wake of the appointment of two Catholics,
John Roberts and Samuel Alito, to the U.S. Supreme Court. A
lively discussion of the Catholic faith of Chief Justice John
Roberts erupted shortly after then-Judge Roberts's nomination to
the Court. The controversy was sparked by a Los Angeles Times
column by Professor Jonathon Turley of the George Washington
University Law School. 3 The column described a conversation
that took place between Judge Roberts and another Catholic
and responsibilities.
Id.; see also BENEDICT XVI,
POST-SYNODAL APOSTOLIC
EXHORTATION
SACRAMENTUM CARITATIS
83 (2007), reprinted in 36 ORIGINS CNS DOCUMENTARY
SERVICE 629, 652 (2007) [hereinafter SACRAMENTUM CARITATIS] ("[A] public witness
to our faith" is called for from "all the baptized, yet it is especially incumbent upon
those who, by virtue of their social or political position, must make decisions
regarding fundamental values such as... the promotion of the common good in all
its forms."); U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, FAITHFUL CITIZENSHIP: A
CATHOLIC CALL TO POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY 7-8 (2003). As David Hollenbach,
S.J., has noted, the concept of the common good is unfamiliar-perhaps "nearly
incomprehensible"-to many Americans today. DAVID HOLLENBACH, S.J., THE
COMMON GOOD AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS xiii (2002). The concept of the common good
must not be conflated with "the largely economic and utilitarian concept of the
general welfare .... [T]his kind of utilitarian standard pays little or no attention to
how [the] overall sum [of economic welfare] is distributed among the members
of... society." Id. at 7. In contrast, the common good "embraces the sum of those
conditions of social life by which individuals, families, and groups can achieve their
own fulfillment in a relatively thorough and ready way." PASTORAL CONSTITUTION
ON THE CHURCH IN THE MODERN WORLD GAUDIUM ET SPES 74 (1965), reprinted in
THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II 199, 284 (Walter M. Abbot, S.J. ed., Joseph
Gallagher trans., 1966); see also CHRISTIFIDELES LAICI, supra note 2,
42 ("Public
life on behalf of the person and society finds its basic standard in the pursuit of the
common good, as the good of everyone and as the good of each person taken as a
whole ....
).
3 Jonathan Turley, The Faith of John Roberts, L.A. TIMES, July 25, 2005, at
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Senator
public official, Senator Richard Durbin of Illinois.
Durbin is said to have asked Judge Roberts the following
question: What would you do if the law required a ruling that
the Catholic Church considers immoral?4
Professor Turley
described Judge Roberts's response in these words: "Renowned
for his unflappable style in oral argument, Roberts appeared
nonplused and, according to sources in the meeting, answered
after a long pause that he would probably have to recuse
5
himself."
Turley went on to characterize Roberts's response as "the
wrong answer" to Durbin's question. The answer was wrong,
Turley explained, because "[i]n taking office, a justice takes an
oath to uphold the Constitution and the laws of the United
States. A judge's personal religious views should have no role in
the interpretation of the laws." 6 Turley gave Roberts credit for
not saying that his faith would control his legal judgment in the
sort of case Durbin proposed, but he did express the fear that, "if
[Roberts] were to recuse himself on such issues as abortion and
the death penalty, it would raise the specter of an evenly split
7
Supreme Court on some of the nation's most important cases."

While Senator Durbin's office has disputed the accuracy of
Turley's description of the conversation,8 Turley's account of
Durbin's question and Roberts's response fueled debate across
4
5

Id.
Id.

The proper role that religious values should play in judicial decision
6 Id.
making (i.e., the proper role that religious values should play in the process by
which a judge comes to decide what the law actually means and demands in a given
case) is a question beyond the scope of this Essay. Indeed, it is a question that is
significantly different than the question that Durbin actually asked Roberts.
Durbin's exchange with Roberts is really concerned with the following question:
What should a morally conscientious judge do when the law as the judge interprets
it is truly unjust and the action that the law requires of the judge in a given case is

truly in conflict with the conscientious convictions of the judge? Many scholars have
considered the distinct question of the role that religious values should play in
judicial decision making. See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND
PUBLIC REASONS 141-50 (1995); MICHAEL J. PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS:
CONSTITUTIONAL AND MORAL PERSPECTIVES 102-04, 155 n.141 (1997) (citing a
range of scholarship discussing the issue); Teresa S. Collett, "The King's Good

Servant, But God's First" The Role of Religion in Judicial Decisionmaking, 41 S.
TEX. L. REV. 1277 (2000); Scott C. Idleman, The Limits of Religious Values in
JudicialDecisionmaking, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 537 (1998).
7 Turley, supra note 3.
8 See David D. Kirkpatrick, Skirmish Over a Query About Roberts's Faith, N.Y.
TIMES, July 26, 2005, at A13.
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the political spectrum about the proper relationship between
Roberts's faith and judicial decision making in the weeks leading
up to the Roberts confirmation hearing.
John Roberts is now Chief Justice of the United States, and,
with the addition of Samuel Alito to the Court, there is now, for
the first time in U.S. history, a Catholic majority on the Supreme
Court.
Five of the currently-sitting justices-Chief Justice
Roberts, Justice Alito, along with Justices Antonin Scalia,
Anthony Kennedy, and Clarence Thomas-are Roman Catholics.
Because the Church offers moral teaching with respect to many
issues that are likely to come before the Court, it makes sense to
think carefully about the issues raised by Professor Turley.
But contrary to the position taken by Professor Turley, I
think John Roberts gave the right answer to Senator Durbin's
question. Judges whose judicial role requires them to perform an
action in a particular case that their religiously informed
conscience tells them is immoral might indeed have to recuse
themselves.9 When a judge's moral obligation to avoid culpable
cooperation with evil prevents the judge from doing something
that the law requires be done in a particular case, then the
judge's legal obligation to discharge his duties impartially directs
him to disqualify himself from participating in the case.10 At the
same time, I do not believe that these general principles, properly
understood, lead to the troublesome consequences that Professor
Turley seems to imagine. We should not too quickly assume that
9 Cf. Avery Cardinal Dulles, S.J., Catholic Social Teaching and American Legal
Practice, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 277, 288 (2002) ("If the existing law is truly
contrary to the conscientious convictions of the judge, the judge may have to recuse
herself rather than cooperate in a morally evil action.").
10 See 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2000).
(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall disqualify
himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.
(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances:
(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or
personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the
proceeding.
Id.; see also John H. Garvey & Amy V. Coney, Catholic Judges in Capital Cases, 81
MvARQ. L. REV. 303, 331-50 (1998) (discussing application of the recusal statute in
the context of capital cases); cf. Rebekah L. Osborn, Current Development, Beliefs on
the Bench: Recusal for Religious Reasons and Model Code of Judicial Conduct, 19
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 895, 897 (2006) (arguing that the ABA Model Code of Judicial
Conduct "effectively and appropriately addresses any concern [about the influence of
judges' religious beliefs on their decision making] by imposing an obligation to
evaluate any potential bias while leaving recusal to the judge's discretion").
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there are a large number of situations in which a Catholic judge's
fidelity to his or her conscience will require the judge to refuse to
fulfill his or her judicial duties in a particular case, and I think it
is highly unlikely that such a situation will present itself in the
context of Supreme Court adjudication.
The analysis that leads to this conclusion moves through
three steps. Part I of the Essay will provide some of the context
behind the controversy over John Roberts's Catholicism. In
particular, it will focus attention on a critical distinction that is
often overlooked in debates about the place of faith in public life;
the distinction between the role of the legislator and the role of
the judge. Part II will then discuss the framework of moral
analysis that we should use to assess whether there is a conflict
between the demands of a judge's conscience1 1 and the demands
11The Catholic Church teaches that "[a] human being must always obey the
certain judgment of his conscience." CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH T 1800

(2d ed. 1997) [hereinafter CCC].
In all his activity a man is bound to follow his conscience faithfully, in order
that he may come to God, for whom he was created. It follows that he is not
to be forced to act in a manner contrary to his conscience. Nor, on the other
hand is he to be restrained from acting in accordance with his conscience,
especially in matters religious.
DECLARATION ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM DIGNITATIS HUMANAE T 3 (1965) [hereinafter
DIGNITATIS HUMANAE], reprinted in THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II, supra note 2,

at 675, 681. See generally CCC, supra, IT 1776-1802 (discussing the moral
conscience). Conscience must not, however, be understood simply as the right to do
whatever one wants. See, e.g., John Henry Newman, A Letter Addressed to His Grace
the Duke of Norfolk on Occasion of Mr. Gladstone's Recent Expostulation, in
CONSCIENCE, CONSENSUS, AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE 434, 453 (1992)

(explaining that conscience must be understood "not as a fancy or an opinion, but as
a dutiful obedience to what claims to be a divine voice speaking within us"); id. at
450 ("Conscience has rights because it has duties; but in this age, with a large
portion of the public, it is the very right and freedom of conscience to dispense with
conscience, to ignore a Lawgiver and Judge, to be independent of unseen
obligations."). The duty to follow one's conscience is rooted in the duty to search for
the truth and the obligation to form one's conscience well. See CCC, supra, 7 178385; DIGNITATIS HUMANAE, supra, 2 ("[Alll men should be at once impelled by
nature and also bound by a moral obligation to seek the truth .... They are also
bound to adhere to the truth, once it is known, and to order their whole lives in
accord with the demands of truth."); Gregory A. Kalscheur, S.J., Moral Limits on
Morals Legislation: Lessons for U.S. Constitutional Law from the Declaration on
Religious Freedom, 16 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 9-13 (2006); see also Joseph
Cardinal Ratzinger, Conscience and Truth, in ON CONSCIENCE 11, 22 (2007) ("The
reduction of conscience to subjective certitude betokens at the same time a retreat
from the truth.").
Conscience for Newman does not mean that the subject is the standard visA-vis the claims of authority in a truthless world .... Much more than that,
conscience signifies the perceptible and demanding presence of the voice of
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of the law that might force the judge to withdraw from a case.
Moral theologians call this analytical framework the principle of
cooperation with evil. Part III will then apply that principle in
the context of three cases, two involving abortion and the other
the death penalty, that arguably present a conflict between a
judge's conscience and the law.
PART I

To begin, we need to focus a bit on the wider context that
made the exchange between Senator Durbin and Judge Roberts
such a lightening rod for controversy. The first relevant element
of that context is the Doctrinal Note on Some Questions
Regarding the Participationof Catholics in PoliticalLife that was
issued by the Vatican's Congregation on the Doctrine of the Faith
("CDF") in November of 2002.12 The Doctrinal Note reminds
Catholics involved in public life that "a well-formed Christian
conscience does not permit one to vote for a political program or

an individual law which contradicts the fundamental contents of
faith and morals." 13 In particular, the Note states that "those
who are directly involved in lawmaking bodies have a ograve and
clear obligation to oppose>) any law that attacks human life. For
them, as for every Catholic, it is impossible to promote such laws
or to vote for them." 14 As the Note explains, "When political
truth in the subject himself. It is the overcoming of mere subjectivity in the
encounter of the inferiority of man with the truth from God.
Id. at 25.
12 CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, DOCTRINAL NOTE ON SOME
QUESTIONS REGARDING THE PARTICIPATION OF CATHOLICS IN POLITICAL LIFE (2002),

available at http://www.vatican.va/roman-curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_
concfaithdoc_20021124 politica-en.html [hereinafter DOCTRINAL NOTE].
13 Id.
4.
14

Id.; see also JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER EVANGELIUM VITAE

73

(1995) [hereinafter EVANGELIUM VITAE] ("In the case of an intrinsically unjust law,
such as a law permitting abortion or euthanasia, it is therefore never licit to obey it,
or to 'take part in a propaganda campaign in favor of such a law, or vote for it.' ").
See generallyJohn Finnis, Restricting Legalised Abortion Is Not Intrinsically Unjust,
in COOPERATION, COMPLICITY & CONSCIENCE: PROBLEMS IN HEALTHCARE, SCIENCE,
LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 209, 209 (Helen Watt ed., 2005) (discussing the meaning of
Evangelium Vitae 73 and the complexity of determining when a law in fact is an
intrinsically unjust law permitting abortion). Finnis argues that a provision is
"permissive" of abortion and intrinsically unjust "only if it has the legal meaning and
effect of reducing the state's legal protection of the unborn." Id. at 209; see also id. at
232-33 (stating that consideration of the legal and legislative context and
circumstances that give rise to a law, as well as a legislator's intent in voting for the
law, are relevant to assessing whether the law's meaning and effect are "permissive"
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activity comes up against moral principles that do not admit of
exception, compromise or derogation, the Catholic commitment
becomes more evident and laden with responsibility." 15 Finally,
the Note asserts that Catholic participation in political life raises
"the lay Catholic's duty to be morally coherent." This duty is
"found within one's conscience, which is one and iridivisible."16
None of us, including public officials, leads parallel moral lives
that can be compartmentalized into separate spheres, one
spiritual and one secular.
Instead, "[1]iving and acting in
conformity with one's own conscience on questions of politics
is... the way in which Christians offer their concrete
contributions so that, through political life, society will become
more just and more consistent with the dignity of the human
17
person."
These principles drawn from the CDF's Doctrinal Note laid
the foundation for the communion controversy that was sparked
by statements made by a small number of bishops during the
year before the 2004 presidential election. That controversy
forms a crucial element of the context behind the discussion of
the relationship between Roberts's faith and his role as a
Supreme Court Justice. The bishops whose statements led to the
communion controversy asserted that Catholic politicians who
espouse pro-choice political positions should be excluded from
receiving communion.1 8
As moral theologian Father Bryan
Massingale explains, "[T]he actions taken by these bishops were
interpreted as just a shade less serious than public
excommunication." Moreover, the bishops "were widely viewed
as implying that it would be immoral for a Catholic to support or
vote for ... a [pro-choice] candidate."1 9 Bishop Michael Sheridan
as that term is used in Evangelium Vitae
15 DOCTRINAL NOTE, supra note 12,
16

Id.

73).
4.

6.

17 Id.; see also Gregory A. Kalscheur, S.J., American Catholics and the State,
AMERICA, Aug. 2-9, 2004, at 15, 15-18 (arguing that a public official's commitment
to moral integrity demands that his or her participation in public life should not be

separated from his or her conscientious judgments regarding issues of justice,
human dignity, and the common good).
18 Cf. SACRAMENTUM CARITATIS, supra note 2,
83 (" '[E]ucharistic consistency'
[is] a quality which our lives are objectively called to embody. Worship pleasing to
God can never be a purely private matter without consequences for our relationships
with others: It demands a public witness to our faith.").
19 Fr. Bryan Massingale, Catholic Participationin Political Life, 35 ORIGINS
CNS DOCUMENTARY SERVICE 469, 471 (2005).
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20
of Colorado Springs, in fact, explicitly made just that assertion.
While the American bishops as a whole ultimately did not adopt
this position, 21 the communion controversy received widespread
media coverage and generated significant anger and dismay
among Catholic public officials, especially Catholic Democrats
with public positions supporting abortion rights.
The debate over John Roberts's Catholicism in the summer
of 2005 erupted in the midst of this lingering anger among some
Catholic public officials that was provoked by the 2004
communion controversy. 22 In the wake of the exchange between
Roberts and Durbin, commentators began to ask the following
question openly: Would the bishops treat the Catholic John
Roberts in the same way in which they had treated the Catholic
John Kerry? Former New York Governor Mario Cuomo, for
example, wondered "how those bishops who tormented [John]
Kerry would react if [Judge] Roberts said that his religious views

20 Bishop Michael Sheridan, The Duties of Catholic Politicians and Voters, 34
ORIGINS CNS DOCUMENTARY SERVICE 5, 6 (2004).
There must be no confusion in these matters. Any Catholic politicians who
advocate for abortion, for illicit stem-cell research or for any form of
euthanasia ipso facto place themselves outside full communion with the
church and so jeopardize their salvation. Any Catholics who vote for
candidates who stand for abortion, illicit stem-cell research or euthanasia
suffer the same fateful consequences. It is for this reason that these
Catholics, whether candidates for office or those who would vote for them,
may not receive holy communion until they have recanted their positions
and been reconciled with God and the church in the sacrament of penance.
Id.
21 U.S. Bishops, Catholics in Political Life, 34 ORIGINS CNS DOCUMENTARY
SERVICE 98, 98-99 (2004).
The question has been raised as to whether the denial of holy communion
to some Catholics in political life is necessary because of their public
support for abortion on demand.... Given the wide range of circumstances
involved in arriving at a prudential judgment on a matter of this
seriousness, we recognize that such decisions rest with the individual
bishop in accord with the established canonical and pastoral
principles.... Bishops can legitimately make different judgments on the
most prudent course of pastoral action.
Id.
22 Posting of Rick Garnett to MirrorofJustice.com, Kmiec, Cuomo, and Russert,
http://www.mirrorofjustice.com/mirrorofjustice/2005/08/kmiec cuomo_and.html
(Aug. 5, 2007, 13:45 EST) (describing the "lingering anger" of many Catholics over
the communion controversy as the "back story" to the debate about Roberts's
Catholicism); see also Sanford Levinson, The Confrontation of Religious Faith and
Civil Religion: Catholics Becoming Justices, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1047, 1067 n.66
(1990) (discussing a similar communion controversy that erupted in 1989).
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would not affect his rulings on abortion cases." 23 Would not
consistency demand that Judge Roberts be subjected to the same
sort of criticism that had been directed at Senator Kerry?
An op-ed piece by Michael McGough in the Los Angeles
Times made a similar assertion: "[F]or those bishops who do
take a hard line against pro-choice legislators, there is no excuse
in theology or logic for holding back from sanctioning Catholic
judges-such as Supreme Court Justice Anthony M. Kennedywho vote to affirm or apply Roe vs. Wade. '24 Amy Sullivan on the
blog Beliefnet made the same argument, claiming that "an
honest look at the Church's statements on the special
responsibility of Catholic public officials to uphold Church
teaching on abortion must conclude that they do not exempt
25
officials in judicial positions."
During the Senate confirmation hearings held in September
2005 and January 2006, Democratic senators pressed both John
Roberts and Samuel Alito to speak about the relationship
between their faith and their judicial role.
In response to
questioning from Senator Diane Feinstein, Roberts made the
following statement: "[M]y faith and my religious beliefs do not
play a role in judging. When it comes to judging, I look to the law
books and always have. I don't look to the Bible or any other
26
religious source."
Five months later, during the Alito confirmation hearings,
Senator Durbin asked Judge Alito what role his personal,
religious, or moral beliefs would play in his judicial decision
making process. Alito's answer echoed the answer given by John
Roberts at his own confirmation hearings:
[M]y obligation as a judge is to interpret and apply the
Constitution and the laws of the United States and not my
personal religious beliefs or any special moral belief that I have.
And there is nothing about my religious beliefs that interferes
with my doing that. I have a particular role to play as a judge.
23 E.J. Dionne, Jr., Why It's Right to Ask About Roberts's Faith, WASH. POST,
Aug. 2, 2005, at A13 (emphasis added).
24 Michael McGough, Catholic Judges and a HigherAuthority, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
1, 2005, at Bl (emphasis added).
25 Amy Sullivan, The Catholic Choice, BELIEFNET (2006), http:// www.beliefnet.
comstory/178/story_17836.html.
26 Confirmation Hearingon the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr., to Be Chief
Justice of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong.
(2005).

220

JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES [Vol. 46:211
That does not involve imposing any religious views that I have
27
or moral views that I have on the rest of the country.

Senator Durbin was quick to praise this answer, noting that
Alito's response acknowledged that Alito was describing "the
same challenge many of us face on this side of the table with
'28
decisions that we face.
Senator Durbin's reaction to Judge Alito's answer is worth
pausing over.
Catholic public officials like Senator Durbin,
Senator Kerry, and Governor Cuomo have often responded to
ecclesial criticism of their voting records by drawing a line
between their personal religious and moral views and their
public policy positions. They contend that, while as Catholics
they may be personally opposed to abortion, they cannot impose
their personal religious views on the rest of the country. The
bishops' frustration with this sort of separation of personal
conscience from political policy was clearly one of the factors
driving the communion controversy that followed the
promulgation of the CDF's Doctrinal Note.2 9 Senator Durbin
27 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr., to Be
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary,109th Cong. (2006).
28 Id.
Similar concerns and questions arose during the confirmation hearings of
Justices William Brennan and Antonin Scalia. See Michael R. Merz, Conscience of a
Catholic Judge, 29 U. DAYTON L. REV. 305, 314-15 (2004) (discussing the Brennan
and Scalia hearings). "There is something fundamentally wrong with a process,
supposedly in support of a pluralist society, which requires a candidate for judge to
abjure any influence in his or her work from deeply held moral beliefs just because
those beliefs are consonant with the judge's religion." Id. at 315; see also Levinson,
supra note 22, at 1062-65 (discussing the Brennan, Scalia, and Kennedy
confirmation hearings).
29 See, e.g., Archbishop William J. Levada, Reflections on Catholics in Political
Life and the Reception of Holy Communion, 34 ORIGINS CNS DOCUMENTARY
SERVICE 101, 101-02 (2004) ("Over the years since the 1973 Roe v. Wade Supreme
Court decision, the frustration of many Catholics, bishops among them, about
Catholic politicians who not only ignore church teaching on abortion but actively
espouse a contrary position has continued to grow."). Bryan Massingale describes
two frustrations on the part of the bishops. First, the bishops are frustrated by what
they see as inconsistency between the expressed personal opposition to abortion by
many Catholic politicians and their failure to engage in public advocacy against
abortion. The second source of frustration is the assumption of many Catholic
politicians (and members of the wider public) that opposition to abortion amounts to
the imposition of a sectarian moral code on a pluralistic society. The bishops
maintain that the church's opposition to abortion is based on the natural moral
law-"a common moral truth that spans religious affiliations"-that can be
recognized and embraced "by all reasonable people of good will." For the bishops, it
is difficult to understand why a politician would hesitate to act on a conviction that
"is an obvious conclusion of common morality," rather than a sectarian position
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seemed to suggest that he detected the same sort of separation of
personal conscience and public decision making in Judge Alito
and Judge Roberts's explanations of the relationship between
their personal faith and their public role as judges. In fact,
Senator Durbin's comment on Judge Alito's answer implicitly
suggests the following provocative question: If the bishops are so
upset with Senator Kerry and Senator Durbin for separating
their personal views as Catholics from their public policy
positions, why doesn't consistency demand that the bishops
criticize Catholic judges for separating their Catholic beliefs from
their public decision making as judges?
In the context of the lingering anger over the communion
controversy, this question of consistency really seems to have
been the subtext underlying much of the debate about John
Roberts's Catholicism in the summer of 2005. In order to answer
Senator Durbin's implicit question, however, we must keep in
mind a critical distinction that is too often overlooked in
contemporary debates about the role of faith in public life,
namely, the distinction between the role of the judge in our
constitutional system and the very different role of a legislator or
a policy maker. Senator Durbin is wrong to equate the moral
challenges faced by legislators and judges in their decision
making.
He is wrong because the different roles held by
legislators and judges mean that legislators and judges are
usually making very different sorts of decisions. 30

rooted in revelation. See Massingale, supra note 19, at 472; see also Laurie
Goodstein, On Abortion, Giuliani Faces a Potential Fall from Catholic Grace, N.Y.
TIMES, June 25, 2007, at A14 ("[C]hurch leaders say they are frustrated by
prominent Catholic politicians like Mr. Giuliani who argue that while they are
personally opposed to abortion, they do not want to impose their beliefs on others.").
"Archbishop John J. Meyers of Newark said .... 'To violate human life is always
and everywhere wrong. In fact, we don't think it's a matter of church teaching, but a
matter of the way God made the world, and it applies to everyone.'" Id.
30 See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) ("[The
judiciary may not sit as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of
legislative policy determinations made in areas that neither affect fundamental
rights nor proceed along suspect lines."); cf. Robert K. Vischer, ProfessionalIdentity
and the Contours of Prudence, 4 U. ST. THOMAs L.J. 46 (2007) (arguing that the
different professional roles played by lawyers and judges make the exercise of
prudential judgment look different in the context of judge's decision making versus
that of a lawyer); id. at 51 ("[L]awyers and judges can recognize and articulate the
ends of prudential judgment only by recognizing and articulating the ends of their
specific roles.").
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Senator Durbin is not alone in sometimes seeming to blur
the distinctions between the different roles played by judges and
legislators. After Justice O'Connor announced her retirement
from the Court, Bishop William S. Skylstadt, president of the
U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, wrote a letter to President
Bush outlining the qualities that he hoped the President "would
contemplate as [he] decide[d] on the appointment of her
successor." 31 Bishop Skylstadt urged the President to consider
candidates with the following characteristics:
[Q]ualified jurists who, pre-eminently, support the protection of
human life from conception to natural death, especially of those
who are unborn, disabled, or terminally ill. I would ask you to
consider jurists who are also cognizant of the rights of
minorities, immigrants and those in need; respect the role of
religion and of religious institutions in our society and the
protections afforded them by the First Amendment; recognize
the value of parental choice in education; and favor restraining
32
and ending the use of the death penalty.

While one can sympathize with Bishop Skylstad's hope that
the President will nominate jurists who support policies that
comport with the basic moral principles of Catholic social
teaching, it is quite another matter to assume that all of those
moral principles are rooted in the U.S. Constitution and other
sources of law in a way that makes them appropriate sources for
judicial-in contrast to legislative-decision making.
As
Professor Theresa Collett notes, "[T]he good of communal selfgovernance [demands that] deep respect for the positive law
33
should govern the vast majority of a judge's decisions."
31

Press Release, U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, USCCB Head Writes

President Bush on Supreme Court Vacancy (July 6, 2005), http://www.usccb.org

comm/archives/2005/05-155.shtml.
32 Id.
33 Collett, supra note 6, at 1299. Accordingly, when religious wisdom "conflicts
with the political choices embodied in the positive law," judicial reliance on religious
wisdom should be restricted. Id.; cf. Ori Lev, Personal Morality and Judicial
Decision-Making in the Death Penalty Context, 11 J.L. & RELIGION 637, 641 (199495) ("[Iff the law recognized a judge's morality as a legitimate source of law, a
judge ... could legitimately invoke such morality as the basis of decision. Given the
'thoroughgoing positivism' of the American legal tradition, however, reliance on one's
personal morality is an illegitimate basis for decision."); Michael Stokes Paulsen,
Accusing Justice: Some Variations on the Themes of Robert M. Cover's Justice
Accused, 7 J.L. & RELIGION 33, 36 (1989) ("[Natural law] cannot actually displace
clear positive law without also displacing the idea of democratic self-government
under a written constitution (a value itself supported by natural law).").
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This sort of judicial respect for positive law-a respect
grounded in a moral commitment to the good of democratic selfgovernment-is consistent with a proper understanding of the
differentiated relationship that exists between law and morality.
As Professor Robert George explains:
[T]he question of how much legislative authority a judge has to
translate the natural law into positive law by nullifying positive
law which he believes to be unjust is a question of positive law,
not natural law. Different political systems reasonably differ
to how much legislative
(both in theory and practice) as
34
authority they confer upon judges.

Letter from Robert George to Sanford Levinson (Apr. 3, 1990), quoted in
Levinson, supra note 22, at 1076 n.85; see also Eduardo M. Pefialver, Restoring the
Right Constitution?, 116 YALE L.J. 732, 765 (2007). "Tlhere is no intrinsic
connection between the natural law's potent language for talking about the moral
quality of the law and unrestrained judicial power. In other words, an affirmation of
natural law theory is every bit as consistent with judicial minimalism ... as it is
with... judicial supremacy." Id. Justice Scalia is critical of Roe v. Wade because it
misinterprets the positive law of the Constitution, not because it allows conduct in
violation of the natural law:
[M]y difficulty with Roe v. Wade is a legal rather than a moral one. I do not
believe-and no one believed for 200 years-that the Constitution contains
a right to abortion. And if a state were to permit abortion on demand, I
would and could in good conscience vote against an attempt to invalidate
that law, for the same reason that I vote against invalidation of laws that
contradict Roe v. Wade; namely, simply because the Constitution gives the
federal government and, hence, me no power over the matter.
Justice Antonin Scalia, Remarks at Pew Forum Panel Discussion: A Call for
Reckoning: Religion and the Death Penalty (Jan. 25, 2002) (transcript available at
http://pewforum.org/deathpenalty/resources/transcript3.php3). The extent to which
nontextual moral norms might, in fact, properly be understood as judicially
enforceable principles of constitutional law has been a contested question since the
early days of U.S. constitutional history. See Gregory A. Kalscheur, S.J., Christian
Scripture and American Scripture:An Instructive Analogy?, 21 J.L. & RELIGION 101,
133 (2005-06) (discussing Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798), and the exchange
between Justice Chase and Justice Iredell regarding the judicial enforceability of
non-textual principles of natural justice); see also HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND
REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 12 (1983) (" 'Due
process of law' is, in fact, a fourteenth-century English phrase meaning natural law.
Thus natural-law theory is written into the positive law of the United States.");
Patrick McKinley Brennan, Against Sovereignty: A Cautionary Note on the
Normative Power of the Actual, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101, 122 (2006) (discussing
"the acknowledged legitimacy (and inescapability?) of 'unwritten law' in our very
own constitutional tradition"); Kalscheur, supra note 11, at 15-20 & 15 n.71 (stating
that even in the absence of explicit constitutional limitations, respect for human
dignity places some matters beyond the legitimate power of a limited, constitutional
government); Levinson, supra note 22, at 1074-81 (discussing the relevance of
morality to constitutional analysis); cf. infra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
34
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This "positivism" of judicial respect for positive law in light
of the limited nature of the judge's role in the American
constitutional system does not, however, mean that judges have
no responsibility to evaluate the positive law in light of
fundamental moral principles as they carry out their judicial
duties:
According to natural law theorists, judges are under the same
obligations of truth telling that the rest of us are under. If the
[positive] law [that the judge is called on to interpret and apply]
is in conflict with the natural law, the judge may not lie about
it. If his duty is to give judgment according to the positive law,
then he must either (i) do so or (ii) recuse himself. If he can give
judgment according to immoral positive law without rendering
himself... complicit in its immorality, and without giving
scandal, then he may licitly do so (though he may3 5also licitly
recuse himself). If not, then he must recuse himself.
Thus, the distinct roles played by judges and legislators
within the American constitutional system call judges and
legislators to make different sorts of decisions with respect to the
law. The role of the legislator is to craft laws that will best
protect that limited portion of the common good that is
committed to the care of the state acting through law. 36 Let us
assume that a legislator states sincerely that he or she is
persuaded that abortion is a grave moral evil because it
constitutes an attack on the inviolable dignity of human life.
That conscientious conclusion is not simply a matter of personal
morality with no public import; it is a moral conviction that
should influence how that legislator thinks about public policy.
Because abortion ends a human life, it is not simply a private
matter. Instead, as an attack on the fundamental human right
to life, abortion is contrary to justice and the common good. 37 If a
legislator desires to live a life of integrity and moral coherence,
his or her participation in politics should not be cut off from the
conscientious judgment he or she has made about the morality of
35 Letter from Robert George, supra note 34 (discussing the "positivism" of
Justice Scalia).
36 For a discussion of the proper limits on the use of the law to promote the
common good, see Kalscheur, supra note 11, at 13-30; see also CONGREGATION FOR
THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, INSTRUCTION DONUM VITAE pt. III (1987) [hereinafter
DONUM VITAE] ("In no sphere of life can the civil law... dictate norms concerning
things which are outside its competence.").
37 See Kalscheur, supra note 11, at 27.
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abortion. Since a legislator's role is to craft positive law that will
best promote the common good, a legislator who holds the
conscientious conviction that abortion is a grave moral evil has a
corresponding duty to craft laws aimed towards reducing the
incidence of abortion.
How a policy maker should go about striving to reduce the
incidence of abortion in contemporary American culture, under
existing constitutional constraints and in the face of significant
social disagreement with regard to the underlying moral issue, is
an exceptionally complicated question. Good lawmaking is never
simply a matter of directly transposing moral conclusions into
rules of civil law. Drawing on jurisprudential principles rooted in
the thought of Thomas Aquinas, the Jesuit theologian John
Courtney Murray explained that moral law and civil law are
essentially related, but necessarily differentiated:
Both the science and art of jurisprudence and also the
statesman's craft rest on the differential character of law and
morals, of legal experience and religious or moral experience, of
political unity and religious unity. The jurist's work proceeds
from the axiom that the principles of religion or morality cannot
be transgressed,but neither can they be immediately translated
into civilized human law. There is an intermediate step, the

inspection of circumstances and the consideration of... the
public advantage to be found, or not found, in transforming a
into a compulsory rule for general
moral or religious principle
38
enforcement upon society.
38

John Courtney Murray, S.J., Leo XIII and Pius XI" Government and the

Order of Religion, in RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: CATHOLIC STRUGGLES WITH PLURALISM
49, 58-60 (J. Leon Hooper, S.J. ed., 1993) (emphasis added); see DONUM VITAE,

supra note 36, pt. III ("The intervention of the public authority must be inspired by
the rational principles which regulate the relationships between civil law and moral
law ....

[the civil law] must sometimes tolerate, for the sake of public order, things

which it cannot forbid without a greater evil resulting."); Gregory A. Kalscheur, S.J.,
John Paul II, John Courtney Murray, and the Relationship Between Civil Law and
Moral Law: A Constructive Proposal for Contemporary American Pluralism, 1 J.
CATH. SOC. THOUGHT 231, 253-58, 263-64, 266-67 (2004); M. Cathleen Kaveny, The
Limits of Ordinary Virtue: The Limits of the Criminal Law in Implementing
Evangelium Vitae, in CHOOSING LIFE: A DIALOGUE ON EVANGELIUM VITAE 132, 132-

49 (K. Wildes & A. Mitchell eds., 1997); R. Mary Hayden Lemmons, Juridical
Prudence and the Toleration of Evil: Aquinas and John Paul II, 4 U. ST. THOMAS
L.J. 24, 28-29 (2006) ("A certain degree of harm must be tolerated, otherwise the
burden on those not yet virtuous would be so unbearable that they 'would break out
into yet greater evils.'" (quoting ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, pt. I-II,
Q. 96, art. 2, at 1018 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., 1947)
(1266-1273))). As James L. Heft explains:
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Thus, the complex question of how best to promote
fundamental moral values through civil law so as to most
effectively promote the common good in the particular social
context facing the legislator is always a contingent question that
39
calls for the legislator to exercise the virtue of prudence.
While the role of the legislator is to strive to embody in
positive law those policies that will (in the conscientious,
prudential judgment of the legislator) best promote the common
good, the role of the judge with regard to the common good is
significantly different. "[T]he choices involved in making law
differ from those involved in deciding law." 40 The role of the
[I]t is necessary for all Catholics, and for Catholic legislators, to agree with
the Church's moral teaching on abortion. But I also find it not so clear
when it comes to how best to translate that moral teaching into civil law in
a society where only one-fourth of the population is Catholic, and when
Catholics themselves are not all of one mind on how to deal with Roe v.
Wade .... [T]he bishops should be more helpful to legislators by
acknowledging the complexities of the decisions they need to make on
legislative matters related to moral issues.
James L. Heft, S.M., Religion and Politics: The Catholic Contribution, 32 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 29, 42 (2006); see also John Langan, Observationson Abortion and Politics,
AMERICA, Oct. 25, 2004, at 9, 11 ("[T]he enactment of any prohibition of abortion is
not simply the enunciation of a moral truth; it is a political and legal act that is to be
carried out in an arena where there are many conflicting points of view and interests
and where there is widespread hostility to the pro-life position.").
39 See Kalscheur, supra note 17, at 17; see also Anthony Fisher, O.P., The Duties
of a CatholicPoliticianwith Respect to Bio-Lawmaking, 20 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS
& PUB. POL'Y 89, 118-19 (2006) (discussing the virtue of political prudence); id. at
121 ("We must ... be loathe to judge our confreres who differ from us on prudential
matters in the battle against abortion and euthanasia); Kalscheur, supra note 38, at
255-57; Fr. John Langan, S.J., Homily for Fr. Robert Drinan's Funeral,36 ORIGINS
CNS DOCUMENTARY SERVICE 556, 557 (2007) ("The shape of legislation can be a
matter for prudential disagreement, not an issue of faithfulness."); Lemmons, supra
note 38, at 29-33 (discussing the principles of juridical prudence that inform
conscientious legislating); Massingale, supra note 19, at 470 ("Prudence ... seeks
not the absolute best, but the best that can be attained for now."). As Archbishop
John Quinn explains,
It is fitting to bring into our Catholic consciousness the tradition of
prudence in the church's teaching, with its probing question, What will
make the situation better rather than worse for the protection of life in the
full array of its claims? Losing sight of the full spectrum of issues which
affect human dignity runs the grave risk of playing into the hands of those
who are so eager to allege that the pro-life stance is a sectarian issue.
Archbishop John Quinn, The Virtue of Prudence and the Spectrum of Issues
Affecting Human Dignity, 34 ORIGINS CNS DOCUMENTARY SERVICE 334, 335 (2004).
For a helpful discussion of the nuanced, contextual operation of the virtue of
prudence, see Vischer, supra note 30, at 50-52.
40 Lemmons, supra note 38, at 30 (stating that because the choices involved are
different, 'legislative and judicial cases must be distinguished and treated
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judge in our constitutional system is not primarily or directly to
make public policy. Instead, the primary role of the judge is to
use the tools of legal analysis to interpret the Constitution and
laws, and to apply those laws as they exist in the context of
deciding individual cases.
It is true that legal interpretation and judicial decision
making often properly involves more than the mechanical
deduction of conclusions from determinate legal norms. Legal
norms can be indeterminate in a way that demands judicial
specification in concrete cases. 41 Yet, there is still a critical
difference between the role of legislators and that of judges. In
exercising their role, legislators have the freedom to make
whatever policy choices are not prohibited by the constitution
that empowers them to act. Judges, in contrast, do not have
unbounded policy-making power. 42 The legislator promotes the
separately").
41 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. PERRY, TOWARD A THEORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
RELIGION, LAW, COURTS 92-93 (2007) (specifying an indeterminate legal norm "is
not a process of deduction or simple application of a general rule to a specific case;
instead it is an exercise of good judgment"); see Kalscheur, supra note 34, at 135
(discussing Perry's approach to constitutional interpretation); see also PERRY, supra,
at 93 (quoting Richard A. Posner, What am I? A Potted Plant?, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept.
28, 1987, at 23, 24) (stating that to the extent that such a power to exercise good
judgment involves "'a creative decision .... a kind of legislative judgment, [it]
arguably belongs in the hands of the politically dependent, because electorally
accountable, policymaking officials of the legislative and/or executive branches of
government."); id. at 107 (endorsing a "system of judicial penultimacy" with respect
to constitutionally entrenched indeterminate human rights norms as offering "the
best of two worlds: an opportunity for a deliberative judicial consideration of a
difficult and perhaps divisive human rights issue and an opportunity for electorally
accountable officials to respond in a politically effective way").
42 See, e.g., Richard B. Saphire, Religion and Recusal, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 351,
351 (1998). "Judges, of course, wield political power.... But judges exercise a special
kind of power. Generally speaking, the judicial function is not one of lawmaking, but
of law application. It is the judge's task to determine what the law is and to apply it
in the cases before him or her." Id. Legislators (and constitution makers) create the
texts that articulate the norms which provide the "textual anchor" and discretionlimiting "tether" for legitimate judicial decision making:
Without a textual anchor for their decisions, judges would have to rely on
some theory of natural right, or some allegedly shared standard of the ends
and the limits of government, to strike down invasive legislation. But an
appeal to normative ideals that lack any mooring in the written
law ...would in societies like ours be suspect, because it would represent
so profound an aberration from majoritarian principles.... A text,
moreover, is necessary not only to make judges' decisions efficacious: it also
helps to tether their discretion. I would be the last to cabin judges' power to
keep the law vital, to ensure that it remains abreast of the progress in
man's intellect and sensibilities. Unbounded freedom, however, is another
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common good by striving to enact just legal norms. The judge
promotes the common good by interpreting, applying, and
specifying legislatively enacted or constitutionally entrenched
legal norms in a way that upholds the fundamental component of
the common good that is known as the rule of law. 43 While the
judge's convictions regarding morality and justice will properly
play a role in the development of the law, 4 4 the role of the judge
in our constitutional system places constraints on the judge's
freedom simply to reshape the law to conform to his or her moral
convictions about what the law ought to be in order to promote
45
justice and the common good.
Consider this example drawn from the work of Judge John
Noonan of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. In
1995, Judge Noonan authored an opinion rejecting a
constitutional challenge to the state of Washington's prohibition

matter. One can imagine a system of governance that accorded judges
almost unlimited discretion, but it would be one reminiscent of the rule by
Platonic Guardians that Judge Learned Hand so feared.
PERRY, supra note 41, at 206 n.13 (quoting William J. Brennan, Jr., Why Have a Bill
of Rights?, 9 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 425, 432 (1989)).
The search must be for a [judicial] function.., which differs from the
legislative and executive functions; ... which can be so exercised as to be
acceptable in a society that generally shares Judge [Learned] Hand's
satisfaction in a 'sense of common venture'; which will be effective when
needed; and whose discharge by the courts will not lower the quality of the
other departments' performance by denuding them of the dignity and
burden of their own responsibility.
Id. at 139 (quoting ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 24 (1962)).
43 Cf. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 270-73 (1980)
(discussing the relationship between the rule of law and the requirements of justice
and the common good).
44 See Vischer, supra note 30, at 63 ("[T]he law's indeterminacy may allow a
judge's rightly formed conception of justice to have a positive impact on the law's
development. The judge's sense of right and wrong,' after all, 'shapes, to some extent,
the direction in which the law evolves.'" (quoting Dulles, supra note 9, at 288)).
45 See Dulles, supra note 9, at 287-88; see also Vischer, supra note 30, at 61.
Vischer states that:
[F]or a judge, extralegal moral norms should be kept at the margins when
evaluating the performance of her professional role ....
[Bly looking
beyond her own moral convictions (which is a starkly different proposition
than pretending her own moral convictions do not exist), she can
acknowledge the moral significance of judging without subverting the rule
of law.
Id.; William H. Pryor, Jr., The Religious Faith and Judicial Duty of an American
CatholicJudge, 24 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 347, 355-58 (2006) (discussing how the role
and duty of the judge differs from that of the legislator or executive).
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of physician-assisted suicide. One of the plaintiffs challenging
the statute was a group called Compassion in Dying. Judge
Noonan's opinion closed with these words: "Compassion cannot
be the compass of a federal judge.
That compass is the
Constitution of the United States." 46 Similarly, while a judge
appropriately brings his or her convictions regarding justice and
morality to the work of deciding cases, 47 Catholic moral doctrine
cannot displace the Constitution and laws of the United States as
the legal compass guiding the judge faced with the task of
deciding what a particular provision of the law means in the
context of a specific case. There is no official Church teaching
that defines what the U.S. Constitution means. Indeed, such a
question is beyond the competence of the Church's teaching
office. 48 Judge Noonan did not uphold the Washington statute
prohibiting physician-assisted suicide because it conformed to the
Church's teaching that physician-assisted suicide is a moral
evil. 49 Instead, Judge Noonan upheld the statute because
46 Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 594 (9th Cir.), reh'g en
banc granted, 62 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 1995). On rehearing en banc, the Ninth Circuit
held that the statute was unconstitutional. See 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996). But this
decision was reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court. See Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702 (1997).
47 See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
48 Cardinal Levada, formerly archbishop of San Francisco, and now the head of
the Vatican Congregation on the Doctrine of the Faith, has asserted that the
"Supreme Court's judgment about the application of the Constitution should ... be
guided by the principles of the moral law." Levada, supra note 29, at 104. It is not
clear what Cardinal Levada means here, but we need not conclude that he is arguing
that the Supreme Court has the power to make decisions that comply with the
principles of the moral law even when there is no basis in proper constitutional
analysis for so concluding. Cardinal Levada notes, for example, that Catholic moral
teaching recognizes "that those who make and interpret the law are not always able
to deal with ideal or perfect solutions." Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the Cardinal
would seem to acknowledge that proper interpretation of the Constitution may
sometimes preclude a decision that reflects the "ideal or perfect" embodiment of the
moral law. As Professor Douglas W. Kmiec, explains, "There is no 'Catholic way' of
interpreting the U.S. Constitution. The tools of constitutional interpretation are its
text, history, and structure." While Catholics with familiarity with the natural law
tradition "will more readily grasp that our constitutional history includes the selfevident truths of creation, equality, and unalienable rights referenced in the
Declaration of Independence," these are not exclusively Catholic truths. Douglas W.
Kmiec, The Catholic Judge and Roe v. Wade, BELIEFNET, Nov. 3, 2005, http://
www.beliefnet.com/story/178/story 17832_1.html.
49 See EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 14,
66 ("To concur with the intention of
another person to commit suicide and to help in carrying it out through so-called
'assisted suicide' means to cooperate in, and at times to be the actual perpetrator of,
an injustice which can never be excused even if it is requested.").
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nothing in the Constitution prohibited the state from enacting
such a statute.
What should a morally conscientious judge do, however,
when the law, as it exists, is truly unjust and the action that the
law requires of the judge in a given case is truly in conflict with
the conscientious convictions of the judge? This question brings
us back to the exchange between Senator Durbin and John
Roberts: What would you do, the Catholic senator asked the
Catholic judge, if the law required you to issue a ruling that the
Catholic Church considered immoral? Roberts replied that, in
such a conflict between his Catholic moral beliefs and the ruling
required by the law, he would probably have to recuse himself.
In this sort of situation, the conscientious judge might indeed
have to remove himself in order to avoid cooperating in a morally
evil action. In other words, the judge will have to decide whether
the action required of him by the law in a particular case
culpably contributes to the morally objectionable act of another
person.
This, then, becomes the crucial question: Does the desire to
avoid cooperation in moral evil make the conscientious Catholic
unfit for judicial service in a constitutional system that will
inevitably bring before the Catholic judge cases that implicate a
host of issues as to which the Church offers moral teaching? I
think the answer to that question is no; there is no good reason
why a conscientious Catholic should not be able to serve as a
judge, and a judge's Catholicism should not raise any special
suspicions about his or her ability to faithfully carry out the
judicial role in the vast majority of cases that will come before
the judge. In order to understand why this is so, we need to take
a very short course in a fairly complicated corner of moral
theology.
PART II
In everyday life, all of us in various ways find ourselves
cooperating in the morally objectionable actions of other people.
A person might, for example, live in a state that provides public
funding for embryonic stem cell research. Assume that the
person accepts the Church's teaching that the destruction of
embryonic human life is a moral evil. Taxes collected from that
person will help facilitate the destruction of human embryos.
Because the tax money facilitates the research, the person is
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cooperating in what he has concluded is a morally evil act. At
the same time, however, it does not seem reasonable to conclude
that the taxpayer himself is committing a morally evil act simply
by paying his taxes as the law requires. 50 In order to help people
navigate these sorts of situations without themselves committing
wrongful actions, moral theologians have developed an analytical
51
framework that is called the principle of cooperation.
Before going any further down this road, I want to offer a
disclaimer: The principle of cooperation is not a bright-line rule
that provides us with many easy answers. In fact, an English
Jesuit theologian once wrote in a textbook that, of all the
principles in moral theology, the principle of cooperation is the
most difficult to apply.5 2 In light of that difficulty, I want to
acknowledge from the outset that the conclusions drawn from
application of the principle of cooperation to particular cases can
often be open to dispute. Indeed, the principle of cooperation "is
not designed automatically to generate undebatable answers to
what are undeniably complex questions." 53 But, the principle of
cooperation is the analytical tool that the Catholic tradition gives
us to help us try to sort out which conflicts between conscience
50 Cf. 3 GERMAIN GRISEZ, THE WAY OF THE LORD JESUS: DIFFICULT MORAL
QUESTIONS 871 (1997) ("[A]ltogether avoiding cooperation... is virtually impossible
and sometimes inconsistent with doing one's duty .... [T]hough taxpayers
materially cooperate with nuclear deterrence and other evils, paying taxes is morally
obligatory.").
51 For a recent discussion of the principle of cooperation in the judicial context,

see generally Edward A. Hartnett, Catholic Judges and Cooperation in Sin, 4 U. ST.
THOMAS L.J. 221 (2006).
52 See Thomas R. Kopfensteiner, The Man with a Ladder, AMERICA, Nov. 1,
2004, at 9, 9 (referring to Henry Davis, S.J., author of Moral and PastoralTheology).
53 M. Cathleen Kaveny, Appropriation of Evil: Cooperation'sMirror Image, 61
THEOLOGICAL STUD. 280, 284 (2000). As theologian Bernard Haring explains,
It is far from our mind to suggest final solutions. In fact, it is not at all
possible to arrive at blanket solutions in every conceivable case if one takes
into account every aspect of the problem. Our first task is to illustrate the
universal principles which are always valid. The conclusions we arrive at
individual instances, however, may in their concrete application under
different sets of circumstances involve new principles.
BERNARD HARING, THE LAW OF CHRIST: VOLUME II: SPECIAL MORAL THEOLOGY:
LIFE IN FELLOWSHIP WITH GOD AND FELLOW MAN 500-01 (Edwin G. Kaiser trans.,
1963). Haring notes that looking at particular cases is a useful way to illustrate
general axioms, but the cases "do not furnish a facile and final solution. Every new
situation must draw from the spirit of the Gospel its own proper solution based on
openness to the concrete realities." Id. at 481; cf. id. at 483 ("[I]t may be difficult,
and perhaps well-nigh impossible, to determine with finality in purely legal fashion
what actually is and what is not scandal in concrete circumstances.").
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and the law ought to lead conscientious judges to refrain from
deciding particular cases. With that in mind, all we can do is
make our best effort to use the tool the tradition makes available.
The general definition of cooperation with evil is
"'concurrence with another person in [an] act'" that is morally
wrong.5 4 Professor M. Cathleen Kaveny, who teaches both law
and moral theology at Notre Dame, notes that the principle of
cooperation addresses the following sorts of questions:
How do we decide when the contribution that our action will
make to another's wrongdoing is too great, or the connection
between their action and ours is too close? When does making
such a contribution [adversely affect our moral character], and
when is it simply the regrettable, inevitable consequence
of
55
living in a fallen world that is also ineluctably social?
Bishop Anthony Fisher articulates the questions addressed by
the principle of cooperation in this way: How close to taking part
in the act itself can one person get to the wrongful act of another,
56
without becoming a culpable accessory?
The analytical framework that has developed around the
principle of cooperation begins to answer these questions by
making a crucial distinction between formal cooperation and
material cooperation. 57 Pope John Paul II, in the encyclical
Evangelium Vitae, stated that everyone is "under a grave
obligation of conscience not to cooperate formally" in evil
actions.58 Formal cooperation is defined as cooperating in a
morally wrongful act while "sharing in the immoral intention
of the person committing [the act]. ' 59 Put simply, formal
60
cooperation in evil is always wrong.
Material cooperation, in contrast, can sometimes be justified
for a proportionate reason. 6 1 A person engages in material
54 Kaveny, supra note 53, at 282 (quoting HENRY DAVIS, S.J., MORAL AND
PASTORAL THEOLOGY 1 (L.W. Geddes ed., 1958)).
55 Id. at 283.
56 See id.
57 See id. at 284.
58 EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 14,
74 (discussing the general principles

concerning cooperation in the evil actions of another).
59

Id.

Kopfensteiner, supra note 52, at 10.
61 As Cardinal Levada explains,
[T]he complex moral analysis of the liceity of material cooperation in evil
60

can be helpful as guidance for Catholics in political life. When formal
cooperation

(evil as intended) is excluded,

some degree of material
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cooperation when he or she does something that facilitates or
creates the conditions for a wrongful act, but the person does not
share in the intention of the actor who actually engages in the
wrongful conduct. 62 An actor has a proportionate reason to
engage in material cooperation when the actor reaches the
conclusion that the reasons for acting are "sufficiently strong
that doing the act would be reasonable despite the more or less
strong reasons to forgo" the act of cooperation. 63 Reaching this
judgment about the comparative strength of the arguments for
and against engaging in the act of cooperation is the "work of
prudence," 64 and the permissibility of material cooperation has to
be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Moral theologians have
developed elaborate sets of categories that attempt to capture the
various factors that help to determine whether a person has a
proportionate reason to engage in an act of material
65
cooperation.
For example, the tradition makes an important distinction
between remote material cooperation and proximate material
cooperation. As an act of material cooperation gets closer to the
wrongful act in time, space, or causal connection, the harder it is
to justify. 66 Whether or not a proportionate reason justifying the
cooperation may be justified, according to the analysis of an individual
situation: Is the person's right intention sufficiently known? Will scandal
be avoided? Does the cooperation aim at lessening the bad effects of the

cooperation?
Levada, supra note 29, at 104.
62 Kaveny, supra note 53, at 284.
63 3 GRISEZ, supra note 50, at 884.
64 Id. at 885; see also id. at 884-89 (discussing how the conscientious actor
judges the relative strength of the arguments regarding proportionate reason).
65 The summary of the analytical framework that follows is drawn from
Professor Kaveny's 2000 article in Theological Studies. See Kaveny, supra note 53,
at 284-86; see also M. Cathleen Kaveny, Prophecy and Casuistry: Abortion, Torture
and Moral Discourse, 51 VILL. L. REV. 499, 526-30 (2006) (describing the "extremely
nuanced distinctions" that characterize the analytical matrix governing the issue of
cooperation with evil).
66 See, e.g., HARING, supra note 53, at 499 ("These reasons [which justify
material cooperation] must be the more valid and weighty ... the more proximate
our contribution or cooperation in the sinful action of others .... ). Grisez rejects
this distinction. He argues that the closeness of a material cooperator's involvement
in the wrongdoing of another is not morally significant of itself. The closeness of
involvement does, however, "correlate... more or less well with many of the factors
affecting the strength of reasons not to cooperate." Highly proximate cooperation
may, for example, make it more difficult for the cooperator to witness to the truth
and may create a higher risk of scandal to others. "Still closeness of involvement is
morally insignificant unless correlated with some factor that affects the strength of
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act exists may in turn depend on additional factors.
For
example, how grave a loss would be suffered by the cooperator if
she declines to engage in the act of cooperation? What is the
magnitude of the evil that will result from the wrongful act
intended by the other person? How certain is it that the act of
cooperation really will be misused by the other person? How
probable is it that refusal to engage in the act of cooperation
would prevent the wrongdoing by the other person? And, finally,
how much risk is there that the act of cooperation will cause
scandal to others? 67 Professor Kaveny notes that "causing
scandal" in this context has to be understood in its specialized
theological sense: Does performing a particular action increase
the possibility that people who witness the action will engage in
morally objectionable activity themselves?
Will the act of
68
cooperation have the effect of leading other people into sin?
This framework for analysis was refined over time through
the process of comparing and contrasting particular cases, which
is known as casuistry. Among the classic cases discussed by the
casuists was a situation particularly relevant to the role of the
judge: Can a Catholic judge preside over a divorce case? The
traditional answer is yes; for grave and proportionate reasons,
such judges may act in accordance with the traditional principles
of material cooperation. 69 The casuists argued that it generally
promotes the common good for a conscientious judge to be part of
the legal system, because of the justice that we hope the work of
the reason not to cooperate." 3 GRISEZ, supra note 50, at 890.
67 See HARtING, supra note 53, at 499 (describing the reasons that justify
material cooperation and "which may even suggest and advise it, if they do not go so
far as to oblige it").
68 See Kaveny, supra note 53, at 285-86 & n.14.
69 See Pope John Paul II, Address to Roma Rota, Marriage Indissolubility and
the Roles of Judges and Lawyers (Jan. 28, 2002), in 31 ORIGINS CNS DOCUMENTARY
SERVICE 597, 601 (2002) ("For grave and proportionate motives [judges] may... act
in accord with the traditional principles of material cooperation."); see also FRANCIS
J. CONNELL, MORALS IN POLITICS AND PROFESSIONS: A GUIDE FOR CATHOLICS IN

PUBLIC LIFE 31 (Newman Press 1958) (1946) (noting that a "sufficiently weighty"
reason for a judge to preside over a divorce case "would seem to be present if the
judge were in danger of losing his office in the event that he refused to accept a
divorce suit, or even if serious antagonism and loss of prestige ensued"); HARING,
supra note 53, at 511 ("Should [the judge] in no way be able to prevent the action
[i.e., granting a divorce to a couple whose marriage is valid before God], despite all
his sincere efforts, we may look upon his granting of the divorce as material
cooperation which is permitted for a grave reason; for loss of office would indeed be a
grave consideration."); Hartnett, supra note 51, at 246-48 (discussing judicial
cooperation in the context of divorce).
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the judge can bring to the institution of the law as a whole. 70 The
judge, therefore, has a proportionate reason for being faithful to
the demands of the law in this case.
This analytical framework also applies to the individual
Catholic in his or her role as voter. As noted above, prior to the
2004 election, the bishop of Colorado Springs, Michael Sheridan,
suggested that any Catholic who votes in favor of a pro-choice
candidate, illicit embryonic stem cell research, or euthanasia,
"may not receive holy communion until they have recanted their
positions and been reconciled with God and the church in the
sacrament of penance." 71 Shortly thereafter, the current pope,
then-Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, in his role as head of the
Vatican Congregation on the Doctrine of the Faith, sent a
memorandum regarding worthiness to receive communion to
Cardinal Theodore McCarrick, then-archbishop of Washington,
who was chair of the U.S. bishops' task force on Catholic
politicians. Cardinal Ratzinger's memorandum concluded with a
discussion of the principle of cooperation as it applies to a voter:
A Catholic would be guilty of formal cooperation in evil, and so
unworthy to present himself for holy communion, if he were to
deliberately vote for a candidate precisely because of the
candidate's permissive stand on abortion and/or euthanasia.
When a Catholic does not share a candidate's stand in favor of
abortion and/or euthanasia, but votes for that candidate for
other reasons, it is considered remote material cooperation,
which can be permitted in the presence of proportionate
reasons.72
Cardinal Ratzinger, however, did not explain how the voter
was to assess whether or not proportionate reasons existed that
would justify a vote for a candidate who takes a permissive stand
on abortion or euthanasia.
The undersecretary of the
70 See James F. Keenan,
S.J., Cooperation, Principle Of, in THE NEW
DICTIONARY OF CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT 232, 234 (Judith A. Dwyer ed., 1994)
(stating that a judge may preside over a divorce case "not solely or even because of

[his] financial needs ...but rather because of the hope that [his] presence in the
institution will lead to less wrongdoing in the future").
71 Sheridan, supra note 20, at 6; see supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text
(discussing the 2004 communion controversy).
72 Cardinals Joseph Ratzinger & Theodore McCarrick, Vatican, U.S. Bishops:
On Catholics in Political Life, 34 ORIGINS CNS DOCUMENTARY SERVICE 133, 134
(2004) (emphasis added); cf. SACRAMENTUM CARITATIS, supra note 2, 83 (noting
that the lives of all the baptized, including those involved in political life, "are
objectively called to embody" a quality characterized as "eucharistic consistency").
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Congregation on the Doctrine of the Faith, Father Augustine
DiNoia, noted that "defining what constitutes 'proportionate'
reasons is extremely difficult,"' 73 and he suggested that the
following conclusion could be drawn from Cardinal Ratzinger's
memorandum: "[A] person might come to be in the state of
mortal sin and therefore unworthy to receive Communion if they
voted precisely with the moral object of extending abortion or the
provision of abortion, but that would be the only case where that
74
would happen."
In the wake of Cardinal Ratzinger's memorandum, those few
American bishops who spoke to the issue of "proportionate
reasons" took a range of positions on whether or not such reasons
75
might exist in the context of the presidential election.
Archbishop Myers of Newark, New Jersey, and Archbishop
Burke of St. Louis, both argued that abortion was such a grave
and widespread moral evil that no proportionate reason existed
that would justify voting for a pro-choice candidate. 76 ThenArchbishop Levada of San Francisco, however, suggested that
proportionate reasons might exist that could justify such a vote:
"[I]f a Catholic voted for a candidate despite his or her pro-choice
77
stance, it would not necessarily be sinful."
The remarks of Father DiNoia and Archbishop Levada
suggest that "issues which require a person to employ
proportionate reasoning on the issue of voting are matters of
78
prudence on which people of good will might well differ."
Indeed, the bishops of Virginia stated that voters should
approach the question of "proportionate reasons" in this way:
Assessing proportionality is a

matter for the individual

conscience. However, a conscience must be correctly formed
before it can be properly followed. In other words, we must seek
the "mind of Christ" in the voting judgments we make, just as
we must do when contemplating any other moral decisions in
73 Heft, supra note 1, at 271.
74 Id. (emphasis added).
75 Id. at 264.
76 Id. at 264-65; cf. id. at 271 ("Even if they are right about the moral gravity of
[abortion and embryonic stem-cell research], and I believe that they are, it does not
necessarily follow that voting for a pro-life candidate, for such reasons, makes the
most sense.").
77 Id.
at 265. "Several bishops, including Bishop John Kinney of St. Cloud,
Minnesota, warned against denying a pro-choice candidate communion, and added
that 'no human is capable of judging someone else's relationship with God.'" Id.
78 Id. at 271.
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our lives. We urge each of you to inform your own consciences
thoroughly, weighing all issues from the perspective of church
teaching and of their implications for our brothers and sisters in
the human family. In doing so, it is important to recognize just
how serious abortion is when considering whether there are
proportionate (i.e., very serious) reasons for making other
79
important issues the decisive factor in our voting choices.

The gravity of the moral evil of abortion clearly is a crucial
consideration in assessing whether it is morally appropriate to
vote for a particular candidate. Yet a voter should also consider
seriously the degree to which a particular candidate is likely to
be able to diminish the actual incidence of abortion, especially in
light of the current constitutional status of the right to make the
abortion decision. Moreover, grave as the issue of abortion
unarguably is, it is not the only very serious moral issue that
demands the attention of the conscientious voter.
The
"promotion of the common good in all its forms" is a value that is
"not negotiable"8 0 as Catholics engage in the careful discernment
79 Paul Loverde & Francis DiLorenzo, The Voter's Responsibility, 35 ORIGINS
CNS DOCUMENTARY SERVICE 370, 371 (2005) (emphasis added); see also supra note
11 (discussing the Catholic understanding of conscience); cf. Quinn, supra note 39, at
335.
[N]or is it prudent for bishops to tell the Catholic people which among

several candidates they should vote for ....The voting booth, like the

confessional, admits only one person at a time. There each of us stands
before our conscience. But not alone. We hope that the charioteer of virtues,
prudence, stands with us.
Id.
80 SACRAMENTUM CARITATIS, supra note 2, 83. The Holy Father identified the
following fundamental values as "not negotiable" in making public policy decisions:
"respect for human life, its defense from conception to natural death, the family built
upon marriage between a man and a woman, the freedom to educate one's children,
and the promotion of the common good in all its forms." Id. Political decision making
should be "inspired by values grounded in human nature," and political decisions
should be based on "a properly formed conscience." Id. While these fundamental
moral values are "not negotiable," translating moral values into positive law in a
pluralistic society is a complex endeavor. Indeed, deciding how best to promote
fundamental moral values through civil legislation that will truly function as good
law promoting the common good in all its forms under the concrete conditions of a
given society demands the exercise of political prudence. The necessary process of
conscience formation is appropriately attentive to the limits of what it might be
possible for the law to accomplish under existing social, political, and constitutional
conditions. See Lemmons, supra note 38, at 30-31; see also supra notes 38-39 and
accompanying text. As John Paul II explained in Evangelium Vitae,
[W]hen it is not possible to overturn or completely abrogate a pro-abortion
law, an elected official whose absolute personal opposition to procured
abortion was well known could licitly support proposals aimed at limiting
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that is required to make conscientious decisions regarding their
81
participation in public life.
PART III
Now we are in a position to apply the principle of cooperation
to the issues of abortion and the death penalty that might
confront Catholic judges working in the contemporary American
legal system. What sorts of issues might create a conflict
between the judge's oath to faithfully and impartially apply the
Constitution and laws of the United States8 2 and that same
judge's moral obligation to be faithful to the demands of his or
her religiously informed conscience?
This question will be
considered in the context of the following three cases:
(1) Does a Supreme Court justice culpably cooperate
with evil by voting to uphold the core principles of
Roe v. Wade8 3 when presented with an opportunity
to overrule Roe? This was the situation faced by
Justice Anthony Kennedy in the Court's 1992
the harm done by such a law and at lessening its negative consequences at
the level of general opinion and public morality. This does not in fact
represent an illicit cooperation with an unjust law, but rather a legitimate
and proper attempt to limit its evil aspects.
EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 14,

73; see also Finnis, supra note 14, at 209, 233
(discussing the meaning of Evangelium Vitae 73).
81 See Heft, supra note 1, at 273 (stating that the "global common good is
precisely what all thoughtful Catholics and especially US Catholics have an
obligation to promote"); see also id. at 273 n.36 (drawing a distinction between "a
collective deed, such as the war in Iraq, which is an action of the US government and
therefore directly and collectively implicates all US citizens" and "abortion which the
government permits but does not perform").
82 See 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2000).
Each justice or judge of the United States shall take the following oath or
affirmation before performing the duties of his office: 'I,
_
, do
solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will administer justice without respect to
persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will
faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent
upon me as _
under the Constitution and laws of the United States. So
help me God.
Id.; see also Merz, supra note 28, at 309-10 ("A judge is bound by his or her oath of
office to enforce the law in every case.... The duty of a judge to follow the law
is... a moral obligation, for the oath of office imposes a strong moral duty."); cf. 3
GRISEZ, supra note 50, at 882 ("[If something must be done to fulfill a responsibility
flowing from a vocational commitment, there is a stronger reason to accept bad side
effects in doing it than if one could forgo the activity without slighting any such
responsibility.").
83 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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decision in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey,8 4 and this is the sort of
situation that seemed to drive most of the
discussion around John Roberts's Catholicism
during the debates that took place during the
summer of 2005.
(2) Does a state court trial judge culpably cooperate
with evil if he issues an order authorizing a minor
to obtain an abortion without involving her parents
in a judicial bypass proceeding seeking to waive
parental notification or consent requirements?
(3) Does a judge who wants to be faithful to the
Church's teaching about the death penalty culpably
cooperate with evil by participating in the judicial
proceedings associated with capital punishment?
Justice Harry Blackmun declared toward the end of
his time on the Supreme Court that he could no
8 5
longer "tinker with the machinery of death." Must
a Catholic judge take the same stance? Can a
Catholic judge cooperate with the "machinery of
death"?
Case #1
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey,8 6 the Court opened up some new space for abortion
87
regulation, while reaffirming the core holding of Roe v. Wade.
The constitutional law with respect to abortion after Casey has
three central components: (1) Prior to viability, women have a
constitutionally protected liberty interest to make the decision to
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari).
From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of
death.... I feel morally and intellectually obligated simply to concede that
the death penalty experiment has failed. It is virtually self-evident to me
now that no combination of procedural rules or substantive regulations
ever can save the death penalty from its inherent constitutional
deficiencies.
84

85

Id.
86
87

505 U.S. 833 (1992).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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have an abortion.
(2) Pre-viability regulation of abortion is
unconstitutional if it places an undue burden on the woman's
right to choose to have an abortion. (3) After viability, the state
is free to prohibit abortion, except where appropriate medical
judgment deems the abortion to be necessary to preserve the life
88
or health of the mother.
Four members of the Court--Justices White, Scalia, and
Thomas, along with Chief Justice Rehnquist-were prepared in
Casey to overrule Roe. Two other members of the Court, Justices
Blackmun and Stevens, wanted to retain the broad protection for
the freedom to make the abortion decision that was drawn from
Roe. The outcome of the case was, therefore, determined by the
remaining three justices-O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souterwhose joint opinion now provides the controlling constitutional
doctrine on abortion.
The joint opinion makes two points that are relevant to the
topic of this Essay. It first develops an argument that attempts
to explain how constitutional protection for the woman's decision
to terminate her pregnancy is supported by a line of precedents
interpreting the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.8 9 This leads the authors of the joint opinion to
conclude that, no matter what any of them might personally
believe about the morality of abortion, the Constitution of the
United States places limits on the government's ability to
regulate abortion. 90
The joint opinion then makes this interesting statement:
Even though Pennsylvania made weighty arguments that Roe
should be overruled, "the reservations any of us may have in
reaffirming the central holding of Roe are outweighed by the
explication of individual liberty we have given combined with the
force of stare decisis."9 1 In plain English, Justices O'Connor,
Souter, and Kennedy are saying that, even if we think Roe was
wrongly decided, it is a precedent that people have come to rely
on in planning their lives, 92 and if we overrule that precedent

See Casey, 505 U.S. at 878-79.
89 See id. at 846-53.
90 Id. at 850 ("Some of us as individuals find abortion offensive to our most basic
principles of morality, but that cannot control our decision. Our obligation is to
define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code.").
91Id. at 853.
92 See id. at 855-56.
88
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now we will do damage to both the rule of law and to the
93
legitimacy of the Court as an institution.
There are good grounds to conclude that the arguments
made by the joint opinion should be rejected as a matter of sound
constitutional analysis. 94 At the same time, however, it is wrong
to conclude that a judge whose informed conscience tells him that
abortion is a moral evil culpably cooperates in evil by taking the
sort of position articulated in the joint opinion. A judge could
reasonably join the joint opinion because he sincerely (even if
erroneously) concludes that the Constitution, when properly
interpreted, does provide protection for the right to make the
abortion decision. Alternatively, a judge could join the joint
opinion because he sincerely (even if erroneously) concludes that
respect for the rule of law prevents him from voting to overrule
the precedent established in Roe.
To conclude as a matter of constitutional law that a woman's
right to make the abortion decision must be protected does
facilitate abortion by creating the conditions that allow abortions
to take place. If Roe were overruled, states would be free to
prohibit more abortions, and some states would choose to do so.
The judicial act of voting to maintain the central holding of Roe
does, therefore, raise the issue of cooperation with evil. But the
judge reaching such a conclusion for the reasons just described
does not necessarily share in the intent of a woman who chooses
to have an abortion. Accordingly, voting to uphold Roe does not
constitute illicit formal cooperation. 95 Moreover, voting to uphold
Roe does not require anyone to engage in any immoral act; it does
no more than say that the law cannot prohibit a particular sort of
immoral act. As Justice Scalia has said, "[A] judge ...bears no
moral guilt for the laws society has failed to enact. '' 96 Deciding
not to overrule Roe might, then, accurately be characterized as a

93 See id. at 869.
94 See, for example, id. at 951-66 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting in part), and id.

at 979-1002 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part), for criticisms of the joint opinion's due
process and stare decisis analysis offered by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Scalia.
95See Hartnett, supra note 51, at 249 ("[Finding a law [prohibiting abortion]
unconstitutional does not necessarily constitute formal cooperation in the evil that
the law sought to avoid. More generally, a judicial decision that determines the legal
allocation of power is not necessarily formal cooperation in the sins of those to whom
the law allocates power.").
96 Scalia, supra note 34.
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form of nonculpable, remote, material cooperation, which can be
justified by the judge's duty to be faithful to his oath to uphold
97
the law as he understands it.
Professor Douglas Kmiec explains that the Church does not
instruct judges to make the law better if doing so would require
them to act outside the proper bounds of their role as a judge.
Thus, Catholic justices do not have a specific Catholic duty to use
their power on the bench to restrain abortion. 98 The judge's duty
is to use the tools of constitutional interpretation to ascertain
how the Constitution deals with the question of abortion.
Professor Kmiec concludes that, "[i]n ruling on ... matters [of
constitutional law], a judge does not become morally complicit in
the underlying act [that the law might allow] or share in [the]
intent" of the actor engaged in constitutionally permitted, but
wrongful, conduct. 99
97 See Hartnett, supra note 51, at 255 ("[I]t is an important and good thing for
judges to decide cases, including constitutional cases, according to law."). But cf.

Bruce Ledewitz, An Essay Concerning Judicial Resignationand Non-Cooperationin
the Presence of Evil, 27 DUQ. L. REV. 1, 9 (1988) ("[Flor the judge who sees abortion
and execution as murder, there is no persuasive excuse for cooperation."). Professor
Ledewitz argues that a pro-life judge should resign rather than enforcing the law in
a way that provides direct or indirect aid to abortion. "The very fact that abortion is
legal offers tremendous legitimation to abortion .... Thus, it may not be possible to
remain a judge at all in a society that allows, and encourages, abortion." Id. at 16.
As Professor Hartnett notes, however, the Catholic judge's refusal to participate in
any abortion cases is unlikely to prevent the underlying wrong of abortion.
"[D]ifferent judges will be brought in to decide the cases in accordance with the
law.... Worse, if Catholic judges refuse to hear abortion cases because of the risk of
material cooperation, their legal perspective on such issues will be lost to the
courts." Hartnett, supra note 51, at 256; see also Lois G. Forer, The Role of
Conscience in Judicial Decision-Making, in THE WEIGHTIER MATTERS OF THE LAW:
ESSAYS ON LAW & RELIGION 285, 301 n.35 (John Witte, Jr. & Frank S. Alexander
eds., 1988) ("I have refused to sit on cases in which the death penalty has been
demanded. The result has been the preservation of my own moral integrity at the
price of submitting defendants to a court composed of 'death qualified' judges.").
98 Kmiec, supra note 48. But cf. Paulsen, supra note 33, at 37.
[J]udges should never apply Roe or other pro-abortion law against
conscience. The moral imperative is to resist Roe through every legitimate
means.... Where it is not possible for the judge honestly to avoid the rule
of Roe, the judge should refuse to enforce Roe in any event, not through the
subversion of the rule of law, but by challenging the Supreme Court's
clearly erroneous holding, by recusing himself in the particular case, or, if
push comes to shove, by resigning.
Id.
99 Catholic Judges, the U.S. Constitution and Natural Law: Interview with
Pepperdine'sDouglas Kmiec, CATHOLIC ONLINE, Aug. 30, 2005, http://www.catholic.
org/featuredlheadline.php?ID=2497. Bernard Haring seems to suggest a somewhat
different analysis:
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The same sort of cooperation analysis applies to the decisions
of lower court judges who, prior to the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Gonzalez v. Carhart,10 0 concluded that controlling
precedent required them to declare unconstitutional the Federal
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003.101 A judge whose ruling
strikes down a law that would restrict some abortions because
that judge reaches the legal conclusion that the law is
unconstitutional is not morally complicit in the abortions that
would have been prohibited by the unconstitutional law.102
Judge Richard Conway Casey of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York faced this situation in the case of
103
NationalAbortion Federation v. Ashcroft.
The plaintiffs in that case challenged the Federal PartialBirth Abortion Ban Act, which bans the procedure the Act
defines as partial-birth abortion, unless the procedure is
necessary to save the life of the mother.1 0 4 Congress passed this
A judge may frequently be confronted by the predicament of pronouncing
'justice' or 'right' according to an unjust law. If by some legal provision he is
permitted to withdraw from the case or is in some way able to avoid
making the decision, he cannot be excused from the guilt of formal
cooperation if he, nevertheless, decides the case. Should this withdrawal be
impossible, then we must hold that his act goes no further than his
pronunciation that the law applies in this particular instance, a decision
which can be viewed as only material cooperation.
HARING, supra note 53, at 510. The judge's intent in pronouncing and applying the
law, however, does not vary according to whether or not withdrawal is an option for
the judge. If the nature of the judge's intent is the key to making the distinction
between formal cooperation and material cooperation, the possibility of recusal in a
given case shouldn't convert a good intent into an intent that coincides with that of
the wrongdoer. It seems that Professor Kmiec has better captured the key
distinction. If the judge in issuing his decision intends that the underlying moral
wrong be done, he is guilty of formal cooperation. If he intends only to say what the
law is, and the law allows a moral wrong to occur, the judicial act is better
characterized as material cooperation, which might be justified by proportionate
reasons.
ioo 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1615 (2007) (upholding the Federal Partial-Birth Abortion
Ban Act of 2003 against a facial challenge to its constitutionality), rev'g Planned
Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Ashcroft, 435 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2006) and Carhart v.
Ashcroft, 413 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2005).
1l See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (Supp. IV 2004).
102 1 am assuming here that the judge sincerely believes that the conclusion he
or she has reached is the proper legal conclusion as a matter of constitutional law.
103 330 F. Supp. 2d 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), aff'd sub nom. Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v.
Gonzales, 437 F.3d 278 (2d Cir. 2006), vacated, 2007 WL 1454322 (2d Cir. May 16,
2007) (noting that the plaintiffs conceded that Gonzales v. Carhartprecluded relief
on their facial challenge to the federal ban).
104

Id. at 439.
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law after the Supreme Court in 2000 struck down a similar
Nebraska law in the case of Stenberg v. Carhart.10 5 The Stenberg
Court held that the Nebraska law was unconstitutional, in part
because it did not provide an exception allowing the procedure
when it was necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, to
preserve the health of the mother. As a lower court judge, Judge
Casey was bound to apply the Supreme Court's decision in
Stenberg as the relevant precedent governing his analysis of the
constitutionality of the new federal statute.
Judge Casey ultimately concluded that there was no way to
read Stenberg that would allow him to conclude that the federal
statute was constitutional.
He closed his opinion enjoining
enforcement of the statute with these words:
While... lower courts may disagree with the Supreme Court's
constitutional decisions, that does not free them from their
constitutional
duty
to
obey
the
Supreme
Court's
rulings .... The Supreme Court in Stenberg informed us that
this gruesome procedure may be outlawed only if there exists a
medical consensus that there is no circumstance in which any
woman could potentially benefit from it. A division of medical
opinion exists, [and] [s]uch a division means that the
Constitution requires a health exception. Stenberg obligates
this Court ... to defer to the expressed medical opinion of a
significant body of medical authority.... Stenberg remains the
10 6
law of the land. Therefore, the Act is unconstitutional.

Such a ruling did not make Judge Casey morally culpable for
the law's inability to prohibit a practice which his opinion
Any physician who, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce,
knowingly performs a parital-birth abortion and thereby kills a human
fetus shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 2 years, or
both. This subsection does not apply to a partial-birth abortion that is
necessary to save the life of a mother whose life is endangered by a physical
disorder, physical illness, or physical injury, including a life-endangering
physical condition caused by or arising from the pregnancy itself.
18 U.S.C. § 1531(a); see also id. § 1531(b)(1) (defining the term "partial-birth
abortion").
105 530 U.S. 914, 921-22 (2000).
106 Nat'l Abortion Fed'n, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 492-93. The Supreme Court in
Gonzalez v. Carhartnoted that "Stenberg has been interpreted to leave no margin of
error for legislatures to act in the face of medical uncertainty." Gonzalez v. Carhart,
127 S. Ct. 1610, 1638 (2007). The Court, however, rejected that reading of Stenberg:
"The Act is not invalid on its face where there is uncertainty over whether the
barred procedure is ever necessary to preserve a woman's health, given the
availability of other abortion procedures that are considered to be safe alternatives."
Id.
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describes in excruciating detail, and which his factual findings
explicitly characterize as "a gruesome, brutal, barbaric, and
uncivilized medical procedure. 10 7 Judge Casey's action is best
characterized as remote, material cooperation that is justified by
the proportionate reason of the judge's duty to be faithful to his
oath to uphold the law, which here includes an obligation to obey
what the judge understood to be a controlling Supreme Court
precedent. 0 8 As Professor Hartnett explains, "[I]t would appear
that in most abortion cases, a judge's material cooperation is
permissible, particularly if a judge takes steps to avoid scandal
by letting others know that his or her legal decision does not
imply approval of direct abortion." 10 9
Case #2
While a judge's participation in most cases involving the
issue of abortion can be understood as permissible material
cooperation, the case of a judge called upon to preside over a
judicial bypass proceeding where a minor is seeking
authorization for an abortion without her parents' involvement is
107 Nat'l Abortion Fed'n, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 479; see also Hartnett, supra note
51, at 268 (noting that Judge Casey's opinion helped to reduce the risk of scandal "by
letting others know that cooperation does not imply approval").
108 For an argument that neither the demands of a hierarchical judicial system
nor fidelity to the rule of law requires a lower court judge to enforce a "controlling"
precedent that the judge concludes is lawless and immoral, see Paulsen, supra note
33, at 82-88, which urges lower court judges to "underrule" Roe by refusing to be
bound by a lawless precedent. "So long as the lower court may still be reversed by
the higher court, there is no interference with either the 'supremacy' of the Supreme
Court or with the idea of the rule of law." Id. at 84; see also id. at 85 ("[W]hile it
might be thought a breach of decorum for an inferior court to repudiate a precedent
of a superior tribunal, such conduct is not constitutionally insubordinate, and is
surely not categorically improper."). Professor Paulsen explains that "[tihe
conscientious lower court judge must not become an accomplice in ...[the] dirty
work" of enforcing an ultra vires interpretation of the Constitution like Roe:
It is possible, perhaps even likely, that a judge following this course will be
reversed (and chastised) by a reviewing court, and directed to enter an
order based on the unjust and unjustifiable precedent.... But when the
source of the judge's ...dilemma is lawless judicial precedent rather than
validly adopted positive law, the judge need not in the first instance follow
the quasi-traditional path of criticism, recusal, and resignation, but should
first undertake to underrule the lawless precedent.
Id. at 88. But cf. Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982) ("[U]nless we wish anarchy
to prevail within the federal judicial system, a precedent of this Court must be
followed by the lower federal courts no matter how misguided the judges of those
courts may think it to be.").
109 Hartnett, supra note 51, at 257.
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different. More than forty states have statutes requiring that
parents be involved in their minor daughter's decision to seek an
abortion. 110 Some states require parental consent while others
require parental notification.'1 1 In order for a parental consent
statute to withstand constitutional scrutiny, the statute must
allow a minor who does not wish to involve her parents in the
decision to petition a judge to authorize the abortion without
parental consent.1 1 2 The Wisconsin parental consent statute, for
example, provides that, except in cases involving a medical
emergency or other specified extenuating circumstances, a
physician may not perform an abortion for a minor unless (1) the
physician has received the informed written consent of one of the
minor's parents or (2) a court has granted a petition waiving the
parental consent requirement.1 1 3 The statute further provides
that the court "shall grant the petition" if the court, after a
confidential hearing, finds either "[tjhat the minor is mature and
well-informed enough to make the abortion decision on her own,"
or "that the performance ...

interest."114

of the abortion is in the minor's best

A judge who believes that abortion is a moral evil and is
called upon to preside over one of these parental involvement
bypass hearings may indeed face a conflict between conscience
and an act that he is required by the law to perform. Unlike the
judges called upon to interpret the Constitution in Case #1, the
judge in Case #2 may be required by the law to issue an order
authorizing a particular minor to obtain an abortion without

110 See Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320, 326 n.1
(2006); Lauren Treadwell, Note, Informal Closing of the Bypass: Minors' Petitions to
Bypass Parental Consent for Abortion in an Age of Increasing Judicial Recusals, 58
HASTINGS L.J. 869, 873 (2007).
111 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.020 (2006) (requiring that "one of the minor's
parents or the minor's guardian or custodian has consented in writing to the
performance or inducement of the abortion"); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-112 (2007)

(requiring that a parent or guardian of a minor seeking an abortion either receive
notice of the procedure from the physician performing the abortion or accompany the
minor to the procedure).
112 See Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292, 295 (1997). While the Supreme
Court has yet to decide whether a judicial bypass option is constitutionally required
in a statute that does not mandate parental consent, most parental notification
statutes do include a judicial bypass option. See also Treadwell, supra note 110, at
873 & n.27.
113 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.375(4) (West 2007).
114 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.375(7)(c) (West 2007).
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parental consent. Would the judge be morally complicit in the
minor's abortion if he or she issued such an order?1 1 5
Keep in mind that there are two grounds on which a judge
might issue such an order.
If the judge issued an order
authorizing the minor to obtain an abortion without the
involvement of her parents on the ground that the abortion was
in the best interest of the minor, the judge's act is almost
certainly best characterized as illicit formal cooperation. "[A]
determination that an abortion is in someone's best interests
constitutes a decision that an abortion should take place." 116
Thus, when issuing such an order, the judge presumably intends
that the minor should proceed to obtain the abortion. To issue an
order with this intent constitutes formal cooperation in the
ensuing wrongful act of abortion. 117
In contrast, a judge who issues an order authorizing an
abortion without the involvement of the minor's parents on the
ground that the minor is mature enough to make the decision on
her own, may be involved in material, rather than formal,
cooperation in the abortion obtained by the minor. The judge
might intend only to apply the law faithfully; he or she does not
necessarily issue the order with the intent that the minor obtain
the abortion. Is the material cooperation involved in issuing such
an order permissible?
115 The principle of cooperation also structures the analytical framework that
applies to the question of whether or not an attorney who believes that abortion is a
grave moral evil can licitly represent a minor in a parental involvement bypass
hearing. See Teresa Stanton Collett, Speak No Evil, Seek No Evil, Do No Evil: Client
Selection and Cooperation with Evil, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1339, 1354-59 (1998)
(concluding that a lawyer who believes abortion to be a grave moral evil cannot
"argu[e] for a court order permitting a minor to consent to the performance of an
abortion"); see also Ind. Planned Parenthood Affiliates Ass'n v. Pearson, 716 F.2d
1127, 1137 (7th Cir. 1983) ("[W]e would certainly expect an attorney who [had
strongly held religious or moral beliefs about the wrongfulness of abortion] not to
accept a court appointment."); Theresa Stanton Collett, Professional Versus Moral
Duty: Accepting Appointments in Unjust Civil Cases, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 635,
640-41, 643-45 (1997) (criticizing an opinion of the Tennessee Board of Professional
Responsibility suggesting that attorneys have an ethical duty to accept appointment
to represent minors seeking abortions, even if such representation violates the
attorney's conscientious belief that abortion is a grave moral evil); Robert J. Muise,
Note, ProfessionalResponsibility for Catholic Lawyers: The Judgment of Conscience,
71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 771, 786-94 (1996) (discussing the principle of cooperation
as an analytical tool that provides guidance to Catholic lawyers making ethical
decisions regarding the practice of law).

116 Hartnett, supra note 51, at 250.
117

See id. at 250-51.
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The material cooperation here is best characterized as
proximate, not remote; the judge's action here is much closer to
an actual act of wrongdoing than is true in Case #1. At the same
time, it is still possible to separate the judge's act of applying the
law from the minor's independent act of deciding whether to have
the abortion or not. If she decides to have the abortion, she
would be misusing the freedom that the judge's obligation to
comply with the law gives her. Still, in light of the temporal
proximity that the order authorizing the abortion would have to
the actual act of wrongdoing, the gravity of the wrongdoing that
is being explicitly authorized by the judge, and the critical role
played by the judge in making it possible for the minor to obtain
the abortion, 11 it may be difficult to conclude that the judge's act
of material cooperation can be justified by a proportionate
reason. Under this analysis, judges who hold the conscientious
conviction that abortion is a grave moral evil have strong reasons
to recuse themselves from judicial bypass proceedings in order to
avoid culpable material cooperation in evil. 119
Judges have in fact begun to opt out of these abortion
petition cases on moral grounds. In September of 2005, the New
York Times reported that a Tennessee judge refused to hear a
minor's abortion petition case. 120 The judge also announced that
he would recuse himself from all such cases in the future. Judge
John R. McCarroll of the Shelby County Circuit Court explained
that he recused himself because he believed that "[t]aking the life
of an innocent human being is contrary to the moral order," and
he, therefore, "could not in good conscience make a finding that
118 Cf.Larry Cunningham, Can a CatholicLawyer Represent a Minor Seeking a
Judicial Bypass for an Abortion? A Moral and Canon Law Analysis, 44 J. CATH.
LEGAL STUD. 379, 395 (2005) ("[A] lawyer who represents a particular minor in a
judicial bypass proceeding would be a necessary cooperator to a specific abortion. He
is directly involved in the death of a particular fetus."). Cunningham suggests that it
might be possible to argue that the lawyer's assistance was not "necessary" to the
abortion:
What is it that he is 'assisting?' It is not the physical act of the death of the
fetus, but instead the minor's decision or ability to have the physical act
performed. His assistance is a step or two removed from the act, and is
legal, not physical, in nature.... A lawyer's assistance is not with the
actual, physical procedure; it is with providing the opportunity for the
physical act to occur.
Id. at 397.
119 See Hartnett, supra note 51, at 257.
120Adam Liptak, On Moral Grounds, Some Judges Are Opting Out of Abortion
Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2005, at A21.
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would allow the minor to proceed with the abortion." 12 1 In effect,
Judge McCarroll was saying that his conscience made it
impossible for him to follow the law that applied to the case.
Four of the other nine judges on the Shelby County Court have
made similar recusal decisions, and the Times report noted that
judges in Alabama and Pennsylvania have also said they will not
122
hear such cases.
In response to Judge McCarroll's announcement, twelve
experts on judicial ethics wrote to the Tennessee Supreme Court
describing his action as "lawless."123 The letter explained that
"[u]nwillingness to follow the law is not a legitimate ground for
recusal." 124 The law professors' letter asserted that Judge
McCarroll's only options were to enforce the law or resign from
the bench. One of the professors, Susan Koniak, said that judges
are free to express their moral disagreement with a law but are
125
not free to decline to enforce a law with which they disagree.
And one of Judge McCarroll's colleagues in Shelby County had
this to say, "I didn't swear to uphold all of the laws of Tennessee
except for X, Y, and Z. You're sworn to uphold the law whether
you agree with it or not." 126 As Professor Bruce Ledewitz notes,
judges are expected to "take any case to which they happen to be
121

Id.

122 Id.; see also Treadwell, supra note 110, at 870 (noting that there have been
judicial recusals from bypass proceedings in Tennessee, Minnesota, Pennsylvania,

and Alabama). In 1993, an Ohio juvenile court judge declared that he would recuse
himself from future judicial bypass proceedings after the county court of appeals
urged him to stop hearing such cases on the ground that his repeated rejections of
minors' requests to waive Ohio's parental notification requirement were the result of
prejudice with respect to the abortion issue. See Catherine Candisky, Twyford to
Quit Ruling on Abortion Requests, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Apr. 23, 1993, at 2C.
123 Liptak, supra note 120, at A21.
124

Id.

See id.
Id. The experts were contacted by Judge McCarroll's colleague, Judge
D'Army Bailey. See D'Army Bailey, The Religious Commitments of Judicial
Nominees-Address by Judge Bailey, 20 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POLY 443,
444 (2006). Judge Bailey stated that:
If a judge could not enforce the law, then, as people have often had to do
when they face matters of conscience, the judge should pay the price of his
or her conscience. The price of a judge's conscience would be to step down
from the bench.... I disagree with the proposition that a judge should have
a blanket recusal in cases of this sort.
Id. But see Hartnett, supra note 51, at 260-64 (arguing that resignation is
"unnecessary overkill" unless the frequency of recusals results in an unfair burden
on the judges to whom the cases are ultimately assigned; in this respect recusals on
moral grounds are no different from recusals on other grounds).
125

126
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assigned ....
No provision is made for recusal in the case of
particular laws regarded by the judge as immoral." 127 If a judge
were to recuse himself because he believed the law was too evil to
be enforced, the judge would fail to do his job. Ledewitz
concludes that resignation, not recusal, "is the only form of non'128
cooperation open to a sitting judge.
Judge McCarroll, however, argued that his recusal from
these cases was both appropriate and required. He noted that
"[a] judge should recuse himself or herself if there is any doubt
about the judge's ability to preside impartially or if the judge's
impartiality can reasonably be questioned." 129 Judge McCarroll's
argument is persuasive: If a judge cannot in good conscience
issue an order to which a minor seeking an abortion may be
legally entitled, the judge cannot reach an impartial decision in
130
the case and should recuse himself or herself.
Ledewitz, supra note 97, at 32.
Id. at 33. Ledewitz proposes the adoption of a sort of judicial "conscience
clause" that would "allow[] judges to opt out of [all] death penalty and abortion
cases." Id. at 3. This would allow judges opposed to abortion and the death penalty
to preserve their moral integrity and witness to the value of life by refusing to kill,
without depriving the community entirely of their talent and wisdom in other cases.
See id. at 3, 33-34.
129 Liptak, supra note 120; see Pryor, supra note 45, at 361 (arguing that recusal
allows the judge both to honor the law "by refusing to disobey it" and honor his
conscience "by avoiding cooperation with evil. . . . The judge cannot be impartial to
his moral duty, and [the canons of judicial ethics] requireU a judge to 'disqualify
himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably
be questioned.' The law acknowledges that judges, in rare cases, should step aside.").
130 See Hartnett, supra note 51, at 259-60; Osborn, supra note 10, at 903 ("A
judge who determines himself to be partial can disqualify himself under the Judicial
Model Code."); Treadwell, supra note 110, at 875 ("If the judge's moral beliefs about
abortion are so embedded in his conscience that he cannot bring himself to neutrally
apply the law, he should recuse himself from the case.").
Based on the current state of the law on judicial recusal, state court judges
who recuse themselves from cases where minors petition the court for a
waiver of the parental consent laws do not violate their ethical obligations
as a member of the judiciary. Rather, judges, who because of strongly held
religious or moral beliefs about abortion cannot impartially apply the law,
appropriately recuse themselves from such cases.
Id. at 877. As Judge G. Gary Tyack of the Franklin County, Ohio Court of Appeals
explained:
"[T]he decision about whether or not to allow a young woman to terminate
the pregnancy without parental notification should not simply reflect the
127
128

preconceived

notions

of a given judge ....

As a

result, we strongly

encourage any judge who cannot fairly and impartially consider these
important issues to recuse himself or herself from involvement in such
proceedings."
Catherine Candisky, Judges Overrule Twyford, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Apr. 4, 1993,

20071

CATHOLICS IN PUBLIC LIFE

251

Case #3
Does a judge who wants to be faithful to the Church's
teaching on the death penalty culpably cooperate with evil by
participating in the judicial proceedings associated with capital
punishment? As the abortion cases just discussed suggest, this is
a complex question because of the variety of roles that judges can
play in the legal proceedings surrounding capital punishment.
Therefore, any cooperation analysis will depend on just what sort
of role the judge is playing.
The Church does not teach that the death penalty is an
intrinsic evil.
This makes imposition of the death penalty
different from the intentional taking of innocent life involved in
abortion.
The current Catechism of the Catholic Church,
however, does insist that the death penalty can only be used
when it is "the only possible way of effectively defending human
lives against an unjust aggressor." 131 When non-lethal means are
available to protect people's safety, the State should limit itself to
using those non-lethal means, because they are more in keeping
with the concrete conditions of the common good and more in
conformity with the dignity of the human person.
Under
contemporary conditions in a developed country like the United
States, society can be adequately protected by keeping criminals
securely incarcerated. 132 In light of this teaching, it is difficult to
imagine when the imposition of the death penalty could be
characterized as a just punishment in the United States.
Thirty-eight states and the federal government, however, do
authorize the use of the death penalty in some cases. 13 3 Can a
at lB. But cf. Ann Crawford McClure, Richard Orsinger & Robert H. Pemberton, A
Guide to Proceedings Under the Texas ParentalNotification Statute and Rules, 41 S.
TEX. L. REV. 755, 801 (2000) (noting that, while the rules do allow for recusal "where
constitutional grounds for disqualification or compelling grounds for recusal
arose[,] ...there was some anecdotal evidence of legislative intent not to allow
recusal, at least when based solely on a judge's views concerning abortion").
"[Riecusal should not be allowed because 'this issue is not about the judge[']s views
on abortion.'" Instead, the only issue before the judge is "whether the minor proves
the statutory grounds for waiver of notification." Id. at 801 n.234 (quoting Report of
the Special Subcommittee on Implementation of Family Code Chapter 33, Appendix
F).
131 CCC, supra note 11,
2267.
132 See id.
133See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 595 (2005) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (noting that twelve states and the District of Columbia do not have the
death penalty, while the remaining states and the federal government authorize the
death penalty).
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judge who accepts the Church's teaching on the death penalty
participate in judicial proceedings that will culminate in the
imposition of an unjust penalty? Can a Catholic judge cooperate
with the "machinery of death"? Justice Scalia, who rejects the
Church's teaching on the death penalty, 134 argues that Catholic
judges who share the Church's understanding of the death
penalty should resign their office if they are unable to uphold the
135
laws they are sworn to enforce.
A more carefully reasoned analysis of the problem is
provided by Dean John Garvey and Professor Amy Coney
Barrett1 3 6 in a 1998 Marquette Law Review article entitled,
Catholic Judges in Capital Cases.137 They argue that Catholic
judges who accept the teaching of the Church are morally
precluded from enforcing the death penalty.
Determining
whether this judgment of conscience will require the judge to
recuse herself from participating in a capital case, however, will
depend on the particular role that the judge plays in the
proceedings. For example, a judge who accepts the Church's
teaching should withdraw from any role that will require her to
impose a sentence on a defendant in a death penalty case. Dean
See Scalia, supra note 34.
In Justice Scalia's view,
the choice for the judge who believes the death penalty to be immoral is
resignation rather than simply ignoring duly enacted constitutional laws
and sabotaging the death penalty. He has, after all, taken an oath to apply
those laws, and has been given no power to supplant them with rules of his

134
135

own.

Id. Unlike Justice Scalia, U.S. Magistrate Judge Michael R. Merz believes that the
Church's teaching on the death penalty is correct. See Merz, supra note 28, at 31113, 318. At the same time, however, Magistrate Judge Merz concludes that he and
other Catholic judges can in good conscience preside over death penalty cases:
Because the prudential judgment about whether capital punishment
remains necessary to defend innocent life is one about which reasonable,
moral people can differ, whether we shall have it or not should be left to the
mechanisms of democracy. Where the legislature has made a different
judgment from the pope, a Catholic can still be a conscientious judge and
participate in capital cases.
Id. at 318. Magistrate Judge Merz does not, however, address the question of how a
judge who himself or herself believes that the imposition of the death penalty is
immoral and unjust can cooperate in the judicial proceedings leading to the
imposition of the death penalty without doing damage to his or her own moral
integrity. The cooperation analysis discussed in this Essay provides a set of
analytical tools for addressing that important question.
136 Please note that Professor Amy Coney Barrett authored her article as Amy
V. Coney.
137 Garvey & Coney, supra note 10.
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Garvey and Professor Barrett argue that a judge who imposes a
death sentence is engaged in formal cooperation with an unjust
act.138 The judge who issues a sentencing order imposing the
death penalty sets in motion a process in which the government
is bound to execute the defendant unless there is an executive
pardon. The judge who issues the sentencing order intends that
this execution should take place. Accordingly, the judge here
plays a role in an unjust act that amounts to formal cooperation,
139
which is always prohibited.
In contrast, Garvey and Barrett argue that a judge could
preside over the trial on the issue of guilt or innocence in a death
penalty case, so long as the judge does not participate in the
sentencing phase of the proceedings. 140 The judge here would be
engaged only in material cooperation in the death sentence that
may or may not be imposed on a defendant found guilty at trial.
Would the judge have a proportionate reason that justifies such
material cooperation? Garvey and Barrett argue that the judge
would have a strong reason to preside over the trial on the issue
of guilt. Society needs judges to enforce the criminal law; judges
help maintain a peaceful and just society. It is this social
good that should be weighed against the harm of material
cooperation.
The evil of capital punishment is severe-it
amounts to the unjust taking of a life. But the judge here does
not actually participate in the sentencing, and does not know for
sure that the death penalty will actually be imposed when the
sentencing phase of the case takes place. Recusal would not
prevent the evil, because the judge would simply be replaced by
another judge. For these reasons, Garvey and Barrett conclude
that the material cooperation in capital punishment provided by
the judge's participation in the guilt phase of the case is morally
justified. 141
The most difficult question of cooperation to analyze in the
death penalty context might be faced by a judge reviewing a
death sentence on direct appeal. 142 Such a judge may not intend
138 See id. at 318, 322-23.
139 See id. at 321-22. But cf. Hartnett, supra note 51, at 245-46 (suggesting
that, because a sentencing order might be understood as permission to the executive
to kill, rather than a command to kill, sentencing a defendant to death may not
always amount to formal cooperation).
140 Garvey & Coney, supra note 10, at 324-25.
141 See id. at 325.
142 See id. at 326-29.
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that an execution take place; affirming the sentence simply
means that the trial court has followed the law in imposing the
death penalty. The appellate judge, therefore, need not be
characterized as intentionally directing or promoting the
defendant's execution in a way that amounts to illicit formal
cooperation in the execution. But, affirming the sentence would
be an act of material cooperation that allows the execution to go
forward. Is the material cooperation involved in affirming the
death sentence justified by a proportionate reason?
Garvey and Barrett are unsure whether the judge should
reach that conclusion. Their uncertainty is rooted in their sense
that most people would probably understand the act of affirming
the death sentence as endorsement of the death sentence. 143 This
raises the issue of scandal. Moral theologian Germain Grisez
explains that
[slometimes the fact that 'good' people are involved [in a process
that leads to wrongdoing] makes wrongdoing seem not so wrong
and provides material for rationalization and self-deception
by people tempted to undertake the same sort of
wrong .... [O]ften the material cooperation of 'good' people in
wrongdoing leads others to cooperate in it formally. 144
These considerations lead Garvey and Barrett to conclude
that it is "exceedingly difficult to pass [general] judgment on the
[morality of participating in the direct] appellate review of
[capital] sentencing." 145 An appellate judge attentive to the
potential for scandal involved in affirming a death sentence
might, for example, effectively reduce the risk of scandal by
writing an opinion that highlights the distinction between legal
judgment and moral judgment and lets others know that
"cooperation does not imply approval."'146
A Supreme Court Justice like John Roberts, however, is not
likely to be involved in this sort of direct appellate review of a
particular capital sentence. The Supreme Court typically gets
involved in the issue of the death penalty in a less direct way.
The Supreme Court may be asked to decide whether the lower
court proceedings afforded the defendant all the procedural
rights required by the Constitution, or whether the capital
143
144
145
146

See id. at 328-29.
Id. at 329 (quoting 3 GRISEZ, supra note 50, at 881).
Garvey & Coney, supra note 10, at 329.
Hartnett, supranote 51, at 268.
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sentencing law enacted by Congress or a state legislature is
consistent with the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment. The questions here boil down to whether
or not other political actors have made decisions that are
authorized by the Constitution. A Supreme Court justice might
well conclude that the Eighth Amendment does not prevent
Congress or a state legislature from enacting the death
penalty.147 That conclusion of constitutional law is difficult to
characterize as a moral endorsement of the legislature's
independent choice to in fact authorize use of the death penalty.
The judicial act of choosing not to undo the constitutionally
authorized decision of another political actor is, therefore, a form
of remote material cooperation that can be justified by the judge's
duty to faithfully interpret the Constitution and respect the
division of authority established by the Constitution. 148
CONCLUSION
The conclusions proposed for each of the cases discussed in
this Essay may well be open to reasonable debate. One thing,
however, should be clear: Careful attention to the role being
played by the judge in a given case is essential to an adequate
analysis of the cooperation issue. Contrary to Professor Turley's
suggestion, it is highly unlikely that a Supreme Court Justice
like John Roberts will find himself facing the sort of conflict
between conscience and the Constitution that might require him
to withdraw from participating in an abortion or death penalty
case. Indeed, trial judges-who may be required by the law to
issue orders authorizing a minor's abortion in a parental
involvement bypass hearing or enforcing the death penalty in the
sentencing phase of a capital case-are more likely to face a
conflict between conscience and the law that might demand
recusal in order to avoid culpable cooperation with evil.
In the end, the willingness of judges, legislators, and voters
to wrestle with the question of cooperation is at least as
important as the particular conclusions that any individual
might reach in analyzing a particular case. Much of the debate
about the role of Catholics in public life has failed to address this
complex issue with the nuance and careful attention to role

147
148

Garvey & Coney, supra note 10, at 330.
See id. at 331.
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distinctions that the long tradition of Catholic reflection on the
principle of cooperation offers to us. 149 We should, therefore,
attend to the question of cooperation with evil with conscientious
care, because the principle of cooperation is not simply a matter
of abstract theological speculation. At the heart of the analysis
that has developed around the principle of cooperation is the
question of what sort of people we will become through our
actions in the world. 15 0 Those actions-including our actions in
public life when we decide cases as judges and cast votes as
legislators or as citizens-shape our characters, and thereby
15 1
influence the kinds of people we will become.
We could avoid some difficult questions by fleeing from
participation in public life in an effort to insulate ourselves from
any risk of ever cooperating in another person's wrongful
action.152 But this would be a serious mistake. Bernard Haring
puts the issue clearly in focus:
It might be very easy for one who has withdrawn from the world
and who is concerned only with the salvation of his own soul to
condemn with smug horror every species of material
cooperation. But one who "in the world" wills to be active for
the kingdom of God and the salvation of those who are in
spiritual jeopardy will view the matter in quite a different light.
He is faced with a serious problem. Any hyper-rigorous stance
respecting material cooperation ...simply renders the exercise
of the lay apostolate totally impossible. Anyone who sets up in
149 Cf. Richard A. McCormick, S.J., Vive le Difference! Killing and Allowing to
Die, AMERICA, Dec. 6, 1997, at 6, 12 ("I end with a well-known aphorism: Qui bene
distinguit bene cognoscit (the person who distinguishes well understands well).").
150 See M. Cathleen Kaveny, Tax Lawyers, Prophetsand Pilgrims:A Response to
Anthony Fisher, in COOPERATION, COMPLICITY & CONSCIENCE: PROBLEMS IN
HEALTHCARE, SCIENCE, LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 66 (Helen Watt ed., 2005); see also
HAIRING, supra note 53, at 495 ("[G]uilty cooperation above all violates Christian love
of self.").
151 See Hartnett, supra note 51, at 256 ("There is some risk of harm to the judge
from repeated material cooperation." (emphasis added)); id. at 268 (urging judges to
"take care that the cumulative impact of material cooperation does not lead you to
slide from material to formal cooperation or alter your fundamental [moral]
commitment"); Ledewitz, supra note 97, at 3 ("The community should not command
judges with moral qualms to order abortions or sign death sentences. If these judges
obey, they have to that extent diminished their humanity.").
152 See Kaveny, supra note 150, at 69. As Dean Garvey notes, "[W]e should not
be too hasty to assume that our legal system is corrupt, and that the best way to
defend our virtue is to steer clear of it. The moral life is more complicated than that."
John Garvey, Law & Morality: Divorce, the Death Penalty, and the Pope,
COMMONWEAL, Apr. 19, 2002, at 10, 12.
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his moral code the rigid principle forbidding any action which
might be perverted by others must, to cite but one example,
remain aloof
renounce politics entirely. He will be obliged to
153
from many significant areas of apostolic activity.

The gospel calls us to cooperate with God's love at work in
the world through the ways in which we live our daily lives in the
world. We respond to this call to cooperate with God's love in the
midst of the concrete demands of our lives as judges, legislators,
lawyers, and voters. 154 As we try to cooperate with God's Spirit
at work in a human community that is also marked by ambiguity
and sin, 155 we need to pay attention to these questions: Who are

we becoming as people through the actions that form us as we
strive to serve the common good in our varied public roles? Are
we becoming ever more faithful to our mission as disciples to be
light and salt for the world, 156 or does our cautious inaction in the
face of the world's needs itself increase scandal? 15 7 My hope is
153

HARING, supra note 53, at 499-500.

See, e.g., id. at 494 ("God has made us instruments and collaborators in the
establishment of His kingdom of love."). As Haring notes,
[Baptism] imparts to the Christian a grace-giving participation in the
redemptive vocation of Christ so that in Christ and with Christ he
cooperates in the salvation of the world.... He cooperates in a
transformation of the arena of his life which redounds to the honor of God
and the salvation of souls.
Id. at 452. If we withdraw from the world "in order to be totally unblemished by the
corruption of the great masses," how can we "bear witness in the midst of the world
to the divine love and cooperate in the fellowship of love reaching out to embrace all
mankind?" Id. at 494.
155 See Kaveny, supra note 150, at 74-75.
[W]e all occasionally discover to our horror that what we have done with
the best of intentions has been used by others to carry out their nefarious
designs. What conclusions does Catholic moral theology draw from this
accidental tragic connection of good actions with the machinations of the
spirit of darkness? Surely we cannot withdraw to the point of missing our
calling to be yeast in the dough, salt to the earth.
HARING, supra note 53, at 479.
156 HARING, supra note 53, at 483 ("The discerning judgment will always take
into account the mission of the disciples of Christ to be light and salt to the world.");
see Matthew 5:13-16 (New American).
157 As Haring explains, allowing a fear of causing scandal to cause us to
withdraw from action in the world may itself risk infidelity to our mission to serve
God's Kingdom:
It is a serious duty to take into consideration the weakness of another
insofar as this redounds to the good of his soul and is within the bounds of
sound reason. However, we may not permit this concern for the frailty of
others to divert us to a mode of action which in the long run would prove
even more hazardous.... Nor may consideration for human frailty in
154
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that this Essay might offer some analytical tools to help us all
attend more faithfully to these central questions of conscience.

others be carried to the extreme of jeopardizing our capacity for essential
decision and joyful effort for the kingdom of God.
HRARING, supra note 53, at 480 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).

